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Executive Summary 
EFG was introduced in January 2009 in response to the credit crunch, as a 
comprehensive and wide-ranging replacement for the long established Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee (SFLG) scheme.  The rationale for both schemes has been to address the 
market failure in the provision of debt finance, whereby viable businesses are unable to 
obtain normal commercial loans, because they lack adequate security or a proven financial 
track record. 
Objectives of research 
Building on the early assessment of EFG undertaken in 20091, the principle objective of 
this research is to determine the actual economic impact of EFG for a cohort of borrowers 
who obtained an EFG backed loan in 2009.  Choosing the 2009 cohort was important to 
allow sufficient time for the impact of the scheme to be observed using a variety of 
indicators, including changes to employment, sales, productivity and exports.  To 
determine the effectiveness of EFG, comparisons are made with other borrowers and non-
borrowers to assess whether EFG contributed to the businesses success.2  
In addition to these business-level benefits, an assessment is also made of the overall 
costs and benefits to the economy using Cost Benefit Analysis.  Economic benefits are 
measured by the value of additional economic output (GVA) attributed to the EFG loan by 
finance additional businesses that are unlikely to displace other businesses.  Economic 
costs are measured as the opportunity cost of finance and the level of defaults that are not 
recovered. 
Methodology 
This evaluation uses businesses self-reported assessment of business performance and 
scheme impact.  The changes to business performance analysis also used econometric 
techniques to control for any differences in the EFG recipient businesses compared to the 
general population.  Although the survey comparison groups were originally matched to 
the EFG recipient group it was necessary to statistically adjust for this using a three-way 
weight which took account of sector, age and initial size of businesses in 2009.  This 
enabled businesses that accessed EFG supported loans to be ‘matched’ to businesses 
with similar characteristics that did not receive an EFG loan. 
In total, 1,399 businesses were surveyed including 500 EFG supported businesses and 
899 unassisted businesses.  The unassisted group included 194 businesses that had 
 
1  www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54076.doc 
2  The borrowing group is the key comparison group as businesses do not seek finance as an end 
objective, but to use the finance to fund a specific purpose e.g. working capital or investment in new 
plant and machinery.  Nevertheless it is also useful to compare EFG businesses to non-borrowing 
businesses, although these businesses are likely to have different characteristics to businesses 
seeking finance. 
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accessed a loan in 2009 and a control group of 705 businesses that had no external 
finance in that year. 
The survey was designed to collect information on additionality including finance 
deadweight and market displacement amongst EFG supported businesses and more 
generally assess their growth orientation, employment and sales growth, as well as 
changes to profitability and exporting.  There were also questions covering more 
subjective business impacts, opinions on the effectiveness of the scheme and levels of 
satisfaction. 
The Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) was carried out using HMT Best Practice as highlighted 
in the Green Book.3  The Cost-Benefit Analysis was conducted using figures gathered 
from the evaluation survey as well as from BIS Management Information.  
Key Findings 
Rationale 
The rationale for EFG at addressing an identified market failure restricting 
potentially viable businesses from raising finance is valid   
The results demonstrate that small businesses lacking security to act as collateral was an 
issue for many EFG businesses.  83 per cent of users indicate they would not have been 
able to obtain a loan without EFG which shows the scheme is well targeted with low levels 
of self-reported deadweight.  The survey results confirm the proportion of EFG businesses 
with collateral available to offer was significantly lower than other borrowing businesses, 
especially the availability of business collateral.  
The reduction in the availability of finance during the recession makes the existence 
of EFG an important source of finance for businesses that would otherwise be 
refused finance   
 The prevailing economic conditions and tighter finance conditions in 2009 suggest the 
scheme was especially important as a greater proportion of businesses reported they 
had fewer finance options available to them compared to the previous SFLG scheme.  
The two previous SFLG studies had found rates of finance additionality of 76 per cent 
(2006) and 70 per cent (1999), but finance additionality under the EFG scheme is now 
higher at 83%.  The Early Stage EFG assessment4 also found that EFG represented 
91 per cent of the total finance package secured by firms, compared with 48 per cent 
for SFLG, also suggesting a greater importance of the government backed loan as a 
result of the tighter supply of finance in 2009. 
Opinions on scheme design and operation 
Timeliness of obtaining the loan was an issue for EFG borrowers in 2009, but may 
not be the case now   
 
3  www.hm-treasury. gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.html 
4  www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54076.doc 
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 More than half of businesses regarded a three month time period in obtaining finance 
as being important for their business and nearly one quarter would notice some 
business effect for loan decisions taking longer than one month.  However, in 2009 
timeliness was one area where EFG did not perform well, with 63 per cent of EFG 
borrowers reporting they waited up to one month or more, compared with just 48 per 
cent of other borrowers.  This may now no longer be the case due to policy changes 
introduced in August 2010. 
The BIS premium appears to be set at the right level 
 The survey asked about the additional BIS premium5 that EFG businesses pay every 
year in addition to interest payments to their lenders.  The survey suggests that 2 per 
cent did appear to be the correct level, since nearly four out of ten businesses claimed 
they would have been deterred from drawing down the loan if the BIS premium was 
raised to 3 per cent. 
Business improvements 
EFG borrowers appear to have fared well in terms of employment and sales growth 
compared to non-borrowers, but grew at a lower rate than other borrowers.   
 Descriptive statistics show over the period 2009-2012 sales growth of EFG businesses 
grew by 33 per cent, compared with 35 per cent for other borrowers and 25 per cent for 
non-borrowers.  For employment growth, EFG recipient businesses grew by 21 per 
cent, compared with 31 percent for other borrowers and 11 per cent for non-borrowers.   
However, controlling for business characteristics, growth levels are similar to other 
businesses including other borrowing businesses.  
 Econometric analysis revealed that these effects were explained by differences in 
business and owner characteristics, for instance EFG businesses are generally 
younger than other businesses.  Having an EFG loan itself (nor the loan amount) was 
not a statistically significant factor explaining changes in business performance.  The 
implication of these results is that EFG creates a level playing field for the 
supported businesses to realise their growth potential, but that business growth 
itself is very similar to the comparison group of other businesses.6  EFG is not 
supporting inferior quality businesses.  The key contribution of EFG is in removing the 
impediment of lack of finance to the growth process. 
 An interesting finding relevant for future targeting of the scheme is that loans used for 
investment purposes, were significantly more likely to be associated with employment 
and sales growth, compared with loans primarily used for working capital. 
Economic effectiveness 
EFG has created additional economic output and employment.  
 
5  Equivalent to 2 per cent of the outstanding loan amount. 
6  EFG does not subsidise the business and the level of the BIS premium is fairly small as a proportion of 
the finance amount so as not to significantly impede the business. 
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 After accounting for deadweight and displacement, the estimated benefits to the 
economy over a 2-3 year time duration from the 6,700  participants drawing down 
an EFG loan in 2009 are: 
o 6,500 additional jobs created, equivalent to 0.96 jobs per recipient business 
o 12,375 additional jobs saved, equivalent to 1.84 jobs per recipient business 
These jobs have generated: 
o Gross Value Added of £567m from jobs created (equivalent to £84,400 per 
business funded) 
o Gross Value Added of £704m from jobs saved (equivalent to £104,600 per 
business funded) 
Benefit to the economy 
Overall, EFG has provided a net benefit to the UK economy.   
 For businesses that were offered and obtained an EFG loan in 2009, the economic 
benefits (measured through GVA) from additional economic activity created and 
saved are estimated to be of £1,270m.  The economic costs of operating the 
scheme which includes the opportunity cost of finance, additional default costs and 
administration costs are estimated to be £178m.  Subtracting the costs from the 
benefits, gives a net economic benefit of £1.1bn.  This therefore shows there was 
a considerable welfare gain to the UK economy in operating the EFG scheme 
during the credit crunch.7 
 Standardising the figures into Benefit Cost Ratios (BCR) to allow comparisons with 
other schemes show:  
o a Societal benefit cost ratio of 7.1, which is favourable compared to other 
business support interventions.8 
o a Public Money Benefit Cost Ratio of 16.4.9 
o a Net economic benefit per exchequer pound ratio of 33.5.10 
 For each year of operation the scheme delivers a net economic return and the ratio 
of benefits to costs increases substantially across the three years of operation 
considered (2009-11).  If a longer time period is considered, the benefits are even 
larger.  This reflects costs being front loaded with the majority of the defaults 
occurring in the first few years, whilst economic benefits continue over many years.  
                                            
7  Sensitivity analysis where just the GVA from jobs created is included also shows a net positive benefit to 
the economy of £370m giving greater confidence in the findings that EFG is providing a net benefit to the 
economy overall. 
8  This is based on including GVA from jobs created and saved.  If the economic benefits are restricted to 
jobs created, the Societal BCR is 3.1. 
9  If the economic benefits are restricted to jobs created, the Public Money BCR is 11.5. 
10  If the economic benefits are restricted to jobs created, the net economic benefit per exchequer pound is 
11.7 
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This will therefore overstate the relative costs of the scheme, leading to the central 
scenario of the CBA being a conservative assessment. 
 The exchequer cost of operating the scheme from loans offered and drawn down in 
2009 amounted to £34m up to the start of 2012.  The scheme appears to be a cost 
effective way of creating additional employment compared to other SME 
interventions due to the relatively low cost of £5,000 per additional job created. 
Conclusion 
This research provides evidence for a continued role of a Government loan 
guarantee scheme for SMEs such as EFG: 
 This evaluation provides evidence confirming the rationale for the EFG scheme, 
namely that it is being targeted at small businesses affected by lack of security that 
would otherwise not be able to access conventional bank loans, and this is 
especially important when the supply of credit is constrained in the economy. 
 The supported businesses are not ailing or weaker than other businesses in terms 
of their growth performance.  Their subsequent business performance is at least as 
good as other borrowing businesses, but EFG acts as an enabling catalyst for these 
businesses affected by lack of collateral or track record to help them fulfil their 
growth potential.  However, EFG loan default rates are significantly higher than 
commercial borrowing rates which does indicate lenders are right to be more 
cautious to lending to these businesses.  Default rate are lower under EFG than the 
previous SFLG scheme which may suggest the BIS cap on lender default payments 
give greater incentives for lenders to identify viable businesses, as well as the 
ability to take security.  This is despite economic conditions being significantly 
worse than when the previous SFLG evaluation was undertaken. 
 At current, albeit low levels of take-up, the scheme appears to be very cost 
effective, in terms of the net economic benefits.  These benefits were shown to be 
positive for every year of operation of the scheme and it was demonstrated that 
they increased over time.  Whilst EFG loans only make up around 1-2% of the total 
SME term lending market, levels of finance deadweight for these businesses is 
currently very low, and the quality of the businesses funded is largely comparable to 
other borrowing businesses that can access conventional funding.  However, 
expanding EFG further by relaxing the entry requirements could lead to more 
businesses benefiting from the scheme, but this needs to be offset against higher 
finance deadweight and possibly lower quality businesses using the scheme, which 
could reduce the reported Benefit Cost Ratios.  
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1 Introduction 
This is the first full evaluation of the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) scheme which 
was introduced in January 2009 to provide additional lending to businesses having 
difficulties raising finance during the credit crunch.11  The evaluation builds on the earlier 
analysis undertaken by the authors in the EFG Early Assessment.12  The early stage 
assessment provided an early indication of the likely benefits of the scheme, although 
these results were only based on the first few months of operation in 2009.  Accordingly 
impacts were not fully evident across this period and the data was not subjected to 
econometric analysis against comparison groups, nor was any Cost Benefit Analysis 
(CBA) undertaken to assess overall cost effectiveness. 
This evaluation report more fully considers the impact of the loan on the whole 2009 cohort 
of EFG users by analysing the results of a telephone survey of a sample of beneficiaries.  
This survey tracked business performance for the period 2009-2012 and provides 
estimates on which to assess these economic impacts against a comparison group of non-
user businesses. 
1.1 Overview of the EFG scheme 
The Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) is a loan guarantee scheme designed to 
facilitate additional bank lending to viable SMEs13 lacking adequate security or financial 
track record to obtain a normal commercial loan.  It is a targeted measure to be used by 
lenders on a discretionary basis and is not a replacement for commercial lending.  EFG 
currently accounts for around 1% to 2% of total bank term lending to SMEs. 
EFG provides loans, overdrafts and invoice finance facilities of £1,000 and £1 million. 
Background 
EFG was introduced in January 2009, as a replacement for the long established SFLG 
scheme (created in 1981) to address the deteriorating economic conditions at the time as 
the recession and credit crunch stuck.  There was considerable evidence showing a 
decrease in new commercial lending to SMEs and a greater proportion of SMEs being 
 
11  Several comprehensive evaluations have been undertaken on the Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee (SFLG) scheme, which was last evaluated in 2010 for a 2006 cohort of businesses.  
Economic Evaluation of The Small firms Loan Guarantee (SFLG) Scheme, Marc Cowling, IES, 
January 2010 and An evaluation of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme, KPMG, March 
1999 
12  Early Stage Assessment of the Impact if the Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) on recipient 
Businesses, Gordon Allinson, Ian Stone, Paul Braidford and Maxine Houston 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54076.doc 
13  EFG is aimed at SMEs.  The scheme supports businesses with a turnover of up to £41 million 
(until recently the limit was £25m).  Some sectoral exclusions apply. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/enterprise-and-business-support/access-to-finance/enterprise-
finance-guarantee/efg-business-sectors 
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rejected for finance as shown by the Bank of England Agents and Credit Conditions 
Surveys.14 
EFG shares many of the policy features of the previous SFLG but makes it available to a 
greater number and range of businesses affected by tighter access to finance conditions.  
For instance, EFG provides loans up to £1 million compared to an upper limit of £250,000 
for SFLG.  In addition, EFG supported businesses with a turnover of up to £25 million (now 
£41 million) compared to £5.6 million under SFLG.  Unlike SFLG, EFG loans can be used 
to convert an overdraft into a loan. As such EFG was nearly 2.5 times larger in scale in 
2009 compared to the previous SFLG scheme in 2008 in terms of the number of loans 
drawn down.15 
To date (October 2012) EFG has generated 19,527 (£2bn) loan offers, of which 17,092 
(£1.73bn) have been drawn upon.  The Enterprise Finance Guarantee will continue until 
2014-15, providing up to £600 million of additional lending to around 6,000 SMEs each 
year and, subject to demand, over £2 billion in total over the next 4 years.16  EFG now 
aims to help such SMEs seeking finance for investment and growth as the economy 
recovers. 
Application Process 
Businesses do not apply directly to the Government or bank for an EFG loan.  Businesses 
seeking debt finance approach lenders17 in anticipation of a normal loan.  The lender will 
typically assess the business against their normal commercial lending criteria for instance 
with regard to the viability of the business, the ability to service the loan, and the 
availability of existing security, in order to determine whether they wish to lend. If the 
business meets the bank’s normal lending criteria but lacks track record and/ or collateral, 
the business may be suitable for an EFG loan. A diagram representing the application 
process is shown in more detail in Appendix 1. 
Decision-making on individual loans is fully delegated to participating lenders and 
integrated with the commercial decision to lend. BIS plays no role in the application or 
decision making process. There is no automatic entitlement to receive a guaranteed loan.   
Conditions of the loan and the Government Guarantee 
The main difference between an EFG loan and a normal loan is the Government-backed 
guarantee.  The guarantee provides protection to the lender in the event of default by the 
 
14  For instance, the October 2008 Bank of England Agents report provided evidence that of the 
firms making some use of external finance, the majority report conditions have tightened, 
which was statistically different from the survey carried out in November 2007, in which a 
majority had not reported tighter conditions.  Furthermore, the November Agents report 
confirmed “Contacts reported a tightening in their own credit conditions since September”.   
15  Around 2,500 SFLG loans were drawn down in 2008 compared to 6,168 EFG loans drawn in 
2009. 
16  These are the nominal values at the time of making the loan offer and this convention is 
followed throughout sections 1-6.  In section 7, the numbers are converted to real figures to 
take into account of inflation and discounting is then applied to convert values to their Net 
Present Value (NPV). 
17  There are presently 45 approved lenders http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/enterprise-and-
business-support/access-to-finance/enterprise-finance-guarantee/efg-list-of-lenders 
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borrower, by providing a 75% guarantee for the remaining balance for each loan in their 
EFG portfolio.  However, the maximum value of government exposure to defaults is set at 
9.75% of the scheme value, meaning that banks are exposed to all of the remaining bad 
debts after this limit is reached.  This was predominantly driven by state aid requirements, 
but in practice helps ensure banks have no incentive to lend to unviable businesses.  It is 
important to note that the Government guarantee does not provide insurance for the 
borrower in the event of their inability to repay the loan. 
The interest rate charged and any other fees and charges applied to the loan are a 
commercial matter for the lender. In addition to this the borrower pays quarterly a premium 
equivalent to 2% of the annual outstanding loan amount to BIS for the lifetime of the loan, 
which partially covers the cost of providing the guarantee.18  The possible term of the loan 
is between 3 months and ten years. 
Unlike SFLG, EFG allows lenders to take security, including personal guarantees, in 
connection with an EFG backed loan. The practice of taking personal guarantees from 
business owners and others associated with a business is an established mechanism for 
ensuring a degree of personal commitment to the repayment of the loan by the business 
and, in EFG, this means that there is a three-way sharing of risk between borrower, lender 
and the Government.  The exception from normal commercial practice is that lenders are 
not permitted to take a direct charge over a principal private residence for a new EFG 
backed loan. 
The scheme involves a variety of different facilities, not just for new loans, but also 
refinancing of existing loans, conversion of overdrafts into loans and other circumstances 
in agreement with the lender. 
1.2 Rationale and objectives of EFG 
The purpose of such an instrument is to address the long established market failure in the 
provision of debt finance to SMEs which requires SMEs to provide evidence of track 
record or collateral to address asymmetric information between the lender and the 
business.  Thus, EFG provides a Government guarantee to the lender in cases where a 
business has a viable business plan but does not have a track record or is unable to offer 
sufficient security for their debt.  Economic uncertainty can increase lenders aversion to 
risk, making the availability of collateral and evidence of a track record more important 
factors in the decision to lend.  
EFG is therefore seen as operating at the margins of commercial lending and is not 
designed to replace mainstream lending decisions.  However, EFG is often used as part of 
an overall package of finance that borrowers put together.  It is estimated that EFG 
accounts for roughly 1-2% of all SME lending by value, although formed nearly 3% of the 
SME lending market in 2009 due to the tighter credit conditions and build up of demand. 
The policy emphasis is very much focused on the provision of additional finance to 
businesses experiencing financial constraints.  Nevertheless, by enabling additional 
lending to businesses this is likely to provide benefits to the economy by sustaining and 
 
18  The BIS premium was discounted to 1.5% for premiums due and successfully collected in 
2009. It reverted to 2% from 1 January 2010. 
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creating jobs, enabling new business start-ups, enhancing productivity and enabling 
exports.  EFG will thus help contribute to the Government’s objective of facilitating growth, 
as well contributing to the ambition to make the UK the best place in Europe to start, 
finance and grow a business. 
1.3 Objectives of research 
The principal objective of the economic evaluation is to provide a robust quantitative 
assessment of the economic effectiveness of EFG and to assess whether it is addressing 
market failures in the supply of finance to SMEs.  The findings are therefore relevant to 
justify the existence of the scheme and inform the ongoing design of the scheme to ensure 
value for money. 
Several fundamental questions need to be asked of borrowers to determine whether the 
scheme is functioning in the intended manner (i.e. additional funding for viable businesses 
that are finance constrained).  To this end the research asks businesses about the extent 
to which they have collateral that could be used for a secured loan and ultimately what 
they believed about their chances of obtaining an alternative loan without EFG (finance 
additionality).  A further question considers whether EFG businesses are in direct 
competition with other businesses and therefore the degree to which improvements in 
business performance resulted in an increase in market share at the expense of 
competitors (displacement). 
The research establishes whether EFG loans have maintained or produced increases in 
business performance, compared to a comparison group.  The performance measures 
examined are: Sales change; Employment change; Productivity change; changes in profit 
ratios and changes in the share of exports accounted for by sales.  
In addition to determining whether the average business improved the report also 
considers the wider impact for the scheme as a whole on the UK economy. In terms of 
economic benefits, there are gains in terms of additional economic output through 
increased employment and sales, net of finance additionality and displacement.  This must 
be off set against the economic costs. 
The net costs to the Exchequer are also considered.  This assessment includes the claims 
made against the government guarantee; recoveries from defaulting businesses; and the 
income from the 2% BIS premium.  There are also other gains in terms of increased 
income tax and national insurance from employment gains. 
The report also aims to show measures of user satisfaction with the operation of the EFG 
scheme and the associated terms and conditions of the finance obtained.  This includes 
the level of interest rates and BIS premium as well as the conduct of the lender. 
1.4 Methodology 
This evaluation uses businesses self-reported assessment of business performance and 
scheme impact.19  Telephone interviews were conducted by IFF Research during January 
 
19  Further details of the survey design and sampling frame are contained in Appendix 1. 
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to March 2012 with businesses who had been offered an EFG loan in 2009, alongside a 
matched sample of non-users from the general business population.  The comparison 
sample group was matched to the EFG group in terms of company legal status and broad 
industry sector (to one level SIC).  In total, 1,399 businesses were surveyed including 500 
EFG supported businesses and 899 unassisted businesses.  The unassisted group 
included 194 businesses that had accessed a loan in 2009 and a control group of 705 
businesses that had no external finance in that year.20 
The survey was designed to collect information on additionality including finance 
deadweight and market displacement amongst EFG supported businesses and more 
generally assess their growth orientation, employment and sales growth, as well as 
changes to profitability and exporting.  There were also modules covering more subjective 
business impacts, opinions on the effectiveness of the scheme and levels of satisfaction. 
In order to identify the ‘true’ impact of EFG, it was necessary to take into account key 
differences in characteristics between the sample groups.  Although the survey 
comparison groups were originally matched to the EFG recipient group it was necessary to 
also statistically adjust for this using a three-way weight which took account of sector, age 
and initial size of businesses in 2009. This enabled businesses that accessed EFG 
supported loans to be ‘matched’ to businesses with similar characteristics that did not 
receive an EFG loan.  Where descriptive statistics are reported for the survey, the figures 
are adjusted to take into account this weighting. 
When assessing finance additionality21, the EFG recipient group is compared against 
businesses who received a conventional bank loan. To assess the wider contribution of 
the scheme, the EFG group is compared to two comparison groups; conventional 
borrowers and non-borrowers.22 
The Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is carried out using HMT Best Practice as highlighted in 
the Green Book.23  The Cost-Benefit Analysis was conducted using figures gathered from 
the evaluation survey as well as from Management Information provided by the Enterprise 
Directorate of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, and other, secondary, 
sources for Gross Value Added figures. 
There are some limitations of this approach.  The first limitation relates to the fact that 
results are self-reported by interviewees and subject to error in terms of their recall and 
expression of opinions, rather than presenting absolute clarity and accuracy.  The other 
aspect of using a survey method is that any result from the survey will only be an estimate 
and particularly in grossing up figures for the population, this will produce a wide range of 
possible values, between more pessimistic lower impacts and more optimistic upper 
estimates. 
 
20  External finance is used for a specific purpose within a business (investment or working 
capital), and so businesses seeking finance may have different characteristics to the wider 
population of businesses. 
21 Finance additionality refers to the availability of conventional bank loans 
22  Although an additional number of comparison groups were identified, it was not possible to 
analyse these in practice due to small sample numbers. 
23 http://www.hm-treasury. gov.uk/data_greenbook_index.html 
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Further limitations in the evaluation as a whole are that our focus rests entirely on 
recipients of the loan, without taking into account how many businesses failed to secure 
any finance through this route or what subsequently happened to those businesses.  The 
evaluation also only includes those businesses that survived up to the survey point, which 
is to say that some weaker businesses will have received support and would have 
received some short term benefits, but these are unknown.  To this end this report 
quantifies benefits for known survivors only for the two to three year period used in the 
Cost Benefit Analysis. 
One final remark is that this study is based on the 2009 cohort of EFG users, reflecting the 
time at which the scheme was introduced.  As such questions relating to the operation of 
the scheme relate to this period of adjustment to the new scheme, rather than reflecting 
any improvements to the scheme made in subsequent years. 
1.5 Structure of report 
The report provides more background on the types of businesses and characteristics of 
business owners in Section 2.  The following section describes the use of the scheme, 
including discussion of user satisfaction.  Section 4 assesses the extent to which the 
contribution of the EFG loan is additional and whether outcomes would have been 
achieved in the absence of the loan.  In section 5 the impact of the scheme is assessed, in 
comparison with other borrowers and a control group of non-borrowers.  Section 6 details 
the costs associated with administering the scheme and providing the government 
guarantee covering defaults.  The results of the cost benefit analysis are presented in 
section 7 and show the benefits net of deadweight and displacement, as well as the net 
position after accounting for the costs revealed in the previous section.  Conclusions are 
shown in section 8. 
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2 Profile of borrowers 
2.1 Introduction  
This section provides a profile of all the borrowers that formed part of the 2009 cohort of 
interviewees from which the sample was taken.  Information on these businesses is held 
by Capital for Enterprise Ltd (CfEL), the Non Departmental Body responsible for managing 
the operation of the scheme on behalf of the government.  As such this information gives 
the complete picture of borrowers, rather than the partial information from the sample.  
This is supplemented by our survey, particularly in terms of the profile of owners. 
Information about businesses that lenders did not put forward as candidates for EFG is not 
known.  Although there will certainly be many more businesses that are considered for the 
scheme, but which never progress, either because of the business itself, or decisions 
made by the lender.  As such information only comes from participating businesses. 
In 2009 there was a total of 7,414 loan offers made by lenders, worth a total of £759 
million.  Businesses are not obligated to take up these offers and indeed 6,724 offers were 
drawn upon by businesses, indicating that nearly 700 businesses receiving an offer had 
either shelved their project or resolved their quest for finance through other channels.  It is 
these 6,724 businesses that formed the population from which the sample was drawn and 
upon which estimates of impacts of the whole scheme are based.24   
The total value of EFG offers that were accepted by the 6,724 businesses in 2009 was 
£682million.  Some of these businesses (1.9 per cent) did not draw down all of their funds, 
either because they did not need the full amount, or had found alternative finance.  This 
means that a total of £669 million was drawn. 
2.2 EFG loans and terms  
Monitoring information suggests that the scheme has some levels of repeat business.  
There was some continuity between SFLG and EFG, with 274 borrowers (4 per cent) 
identified as previously having had an SFLG loan.  There was also evidence that 439 
businesses (7 per cent) had made a second (or more) EFG application.  As well as 
revealing some satisfaction with the scheme and its predecessor, this might tell us that the 
majority of EFG borrowers either do not need to seek any more finance, or alternatively, 
they subsequently obtain further finance without recourse to the scheme, suggesting 
banks may now regard them as less risky propositions.  
Figure 1 shows the amounts borrowed by participating companies.  In particular we draw 
attention to the two changes in thresholds.  The maximum amount has increased from 
£250,000 under SFLG to £1,000,000 under EFG, while the lower threshold has now fallen 
 
24  Publicly available statistics (http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/enterprise-and-business-support/access-to-
finance/enterprise-finance-guarantee/efg-statistics) show that there were 6,168 offers drawn down in 
2009 and the balance of offers were drawn down in early 2010. 
from the SFLG minimum of £5,000 to £1,000.  While these new thresholds would seem to 
encompass more possible borrowers it has in practice done little at the bottom of the 
market, with only 26 borrowers (0.4 per cent) receiving less than £5,000.  However, there 
does appear to be very substantial additional benefits for businesses seeking larger 
amounts.  A total of 525 businesses (7.8 per cent) were now able to borrow more than 
£250,000, suggesting that there was indeed demand from SMEs for the threshold to be 
raised, possibly due to the tighter finance conditions observed in 2009. 
Figure 1 Loan amounts borrowed by EFG participants (2009) 
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Terms of borrowing 
Table 1 shows the terms under which EFG businesses received offers.  The variation in 
the cost of finance does vary considerably and as noted elsewhere these matters are a 
commercial consideration between banks and borrowing businesses, rather than 
conditions set by government.  While interest rates are paid on the outstanding balance, 
fees only apply in arranging the loan.  The arrangement fees charged are not 
inconsiderable amounts but are broadly in line with the wider commercial SME lending 
market. 
There are clear and distinct patterns shown in the table, with the cost of finance being 
greatest for smaller loans, as conventional bank finance would suggest (smaller loans 
generally go to smaller businesses, with the risk of default generally decreasing by size of 
firm).  The average interest rates for small loans (£1,000-25,000) were nearly double the 
rate for larger loans (>£250,000).  The length of borrowing varied less by the amount, but 
smaller loans appeared to be over shorter terms.  The average business borrowed at an 
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interest rate of nearly 6 per cent per annum, with an arrangement fee of 2 per cent and 
borrowed for 76 months25. 
Table 1 Terms of borrowing by amount borrowed 
Amount borrowed 
Average 
Interest 
rate 
Average 
fees 
Fees as % 
of loan 
value 
Av. Loan 
terms 
(months) 
£1000-25000 8.1% £560 3.3% 65 
£25001-50000 6.2% £880 2.4% 76 
£50001-100000 5.3% £1,650 2.3% 83 
£100,001-250000 4.7% £2,770 1.8% 79 
>£250,000 4.1% £8,290 1.7% 76 
Average 5.8% £1,980 2.0% 76 
2.3 Business profile of EFG borrowers 
Table 2 shows the age of businesses using EFG in 2009.  It is evident that many 
businesses were clearly in the start-up category (0-1 years) possibly reflecting that these 
businesses were most likely to lack track record or collateral, while businesses in the next 
four years of trading were very evenly distributed.  The category of five or more years 
exists in part because of the SFLG implementation of recommendations from the Graham 
review to limit the scheme to businesses less than five years.  This was in effect between 
2006 and 2008, but since its abolition it is clear that there was substantial demand from 
these businesses possibly reflecting the tighter credit conditions that occurred in 2009. 
The table also shows the size of loans offered to businesses, according to their age.  
Younger businesses tended to seek smaller amounts of finance, while older businesses 
sought larger amounts of finance. 
Table 2 Age of businesses 
 Frequency Average loan amount 
0-1 years 22.1% £70,400 
1-2 years 6.8% £67,810 
2-3 years 7.0% £78,220 
3-4 years 6.8% £79,370 
4-5 years 6.7% £95,300 
5+ years 50.6% £126,610 
Figure 2 shows size of EFG borrowers, expressed in terms of their sales turnover in 2009.  
Since the purpose of borrowing for many businesses was to start their business then many 
businesses (16%) were unable to supply sales figures.  The businesses tended to be 
substantial businesses, with a median turnover size of £560,000 and only 5% below the 
VAT threshold of £68,000.  The relaxing of the £5.6million threshold under SFLG rules, 
enabled a further 270 businesses (5%) to participate in the scheme. 
                                            
25 A very large proportion of businesses (nearly one third) were repaying their loan over the maximum 
permitted period of 120 months. 
Figure 2 Turnover size of EFG user businesses (2009) 
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Administrative data only records turnover, rather than employee numbers, but some 
indication of employee numbers comes from our survey sample.  Figure 3 shows the 
number of employees per business, expressed in terms of standard SME sizebands and to 
some extent makes for an easier understanding of the size of EFG recipients.  There were 
relatively few EFG borrowers with no employees (only 7 per cent), although this group 
constitute nearly three quarters of the SME population, but their borrowing needs are 
usually more modest and perhaps not appropriate for EFG lending.  There were higher 
proportions of micro businesses with 1-4 employees (28 per cent) and 5-9 employees (22 
per cent).  The most frequently occurring sizeband was for small businesses 10-49 
employees (39 per cent).  Medium-sized businesses were less well represented (3 per 
cent), in keeping with the small numbers reported for higher turnover above.  The median 
size of EFG borrowers was seven employees and the mean 14.3 employees, rather higher 
than for the SME population as a whole. 
 10 
Figure 3 Number of employees in EFG businesses in 2009 
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Table 3 shows the size of borrowing, according to the size of business.  The relationship is 
very clear, in that larger businesses were seeking more finance, although the scale of 
project and level of ambition varied considerably within categories.  The exception to this 
trend was the large amounts sought by companies just starting their business and this was 
possibly because of the larger nature of investment needed to start their business. 
Table 3 Average loan by Sales turnover 
Sales Turnover (2009) Average loan amount 
£0 (Start-up) £71,210 
£1-100,000 £38,930 
£100,000-250,000 £47,710 
£250,000-500,000 £60,550 
£500,000-1,000,000 £83,910 
£1,000,000-5,000,000 £157,700 
>£5,000,000  £401,830 
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Representativeness of EFG loans compared to the SME population 
The following analysis (Table 4-Table 6) compares the 2009 EFG population with statistics 
based on the 2009 SME population26.  Each table shows the number of EFG clients per 
10,000 businesses and 10,000 employees to indicate the extent to which EFG clients are 
distributed within the wider business population.  Because of the variation in business size 
for certain categories, the fairest measure is shown in the third column, comparing EFG 
relative to employee numbers.  EFG data lends itself to three types of simple comparison: 
Legal status; Industry sector and Geographical region.  
As already indicated, EFG is not intended to meet the entire demand for finance by SMEs. 
Whilst EFG covers around 1-2% of the SME bank lending market, the overall coverage for 
all SMEs is less than one per cent, because most SMEs do not seek finance.  Expressing 
this in terms of employees shows that there will be 3 employees in EFG recipient 
businesses for every 10,000 employees in SMEs.   
Table 4 shows that larger limited companies receive more EFG loans per business, with 
nearly three times more than partnerships and more than ten times as many as sole 
proprietors.  This may reflect larger companies being more likely to use dedicated finance 
advisers who are more likely to be able to raise the prospect of using EFG in the lending 
process.  Expressed in terms of employees the relative size of each legal type of business 
restores near parity, although sole proprietors are slightly less likely to receive EFG. 
Table 4 Representativeness of legal sectors 
 No. per 
10,000 
businesses 
No. per 
10,000 
employees 
Companies 39.4 3.0 
Partnerships 13.6 3.0 
Sole proprietors  3.2 2.5 
TOTAL 13.9 2.9 
Table 5 shows the representativeness of EFG borrowers in terms of sectors.  Some of the 
lower participation may be partly explained by sectoral exclusions from EFG.  After 
controlling for the size of some larger sectors, the rate per employee varies considerably, 
this may reflect lenders propensity to lend to particular sectors, the availability of collateral 
in particular sectors or the demand for finance from different business sectors. 
                                            
26 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://stats.bis.gov.uk/ed/sme/ 
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Table 5 Sector representativeness  
 No. per 
10,000 
businesses
No. per 
10,000 
employees 
A, B Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry; Fishing 3.6 1.4 
C, E Mining and Quarrying; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 15.2 1.0 
D Manufacturing 36.0 3.8 
F Construction 6.4 3.0 
G Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repairs 31.1 3.6 
H Hotels and Restaurants 45.8 4.2 
I Transport, Storage and Communication 8.1 1.5 
J Financial Intermediation 1.3 0.1 
K Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities 12.7 3.4 
M Education 6.1 2.9 
N Health and Social work 6.3 1.3 
O Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities 6.6 2.5 
TOTAL 13.9 2.9 
Table 6 shows the representativeness of EFG borrowers in terms of English regions and 
devolved nations.  In terms of employees, all of the devolved nations achieve relatively 
higher rates of participation than all parts of England except for the North East.  The lowest 
rates of participation correspond to some of the most prosperous regions (London, South 
East and East of England), which may reflect availability of collateral in those regions and 
therefore lending occurs through conventional sources.27  
Table 6 Representativeness of UK regions 
 No. per 
10,000 
businesses 
No. per 
10,000 
employees 
Northern Ireland 5.6 20.3 
North East 16.4 12.6 
Wales 16.7 10.9 
Scotland 15.2 8.3 
South West 16.6 6.2 
Yorkshire and The Humber 12.4 4.8 
West Midlands 17.0 4.1 
East Midlands 16.8 4.0 
North West 16.0 3.9 
East of England 14.7 3.5 
South East 13.2 3.3 
London 9.3 2.0 
TOTAL 13.9 2.9 
                                            
27  The South East and London has higher house prices. 
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Table 7 shows the extent to which EFG accommodated particular types of businesses, 
namely social enterprises28 and businesses from deprived areas.  There was a significant 
difference in terms of the incidence of social enterprises among the different subsamples, 
with EFG having the lowest representation of businesses describing themselves as social 
enterprises. 
There was no significant difference between the subsamples in terms of whether the 
business was from a deprived area.  This was in contrast with the SFLG study, which 
found that businesses in deprived areas benefitted more than other businesses through 
their SFLG loan in terms of the loan being more likely to: (i) be a loan of last resort; (ii) 
have higher finance additionality and (iii) have higher project additionality.  None of these 
results were evident for EFG, with assisted businesses from deprived areas being no 
different to other businesses.  This may reflect tighter credit conditions being more 
prevalent across a wider set of businesses than previously. 
Table 7 Inclusiveness of EFG for different business types 
 EFG % Non-
borrowing 
comparison 
Borrowing 
comparison 
% 
All 
business 
average 
Chi-squared 
significance 
Social 
Enterprise 25.9 32.9 35.6 30.8 .001 
Deprived 
area 11.3 13.8 6.2 11.8 .117 
The business characteristics of the EFG population are described in this section, while the 
characteristics of the comparison groups are excluded.  The achieved subsamples of other 
loan users and general SMEs were both different from the EFG user group, but these 
effects were controlled for with a three way weighting of sector, age and size.  As such the 
unweighted profiles of other borrowers and general users are less meaningful. 
2.4 Business practices of borrowers 
This subsection considers the extent to which some key business and management 
practices of EFG businesses are similar to other borrowers and the general business 
population to assess whether there are differences in business quality.  In some areas like 
increased use of formal management practices EFG is shown to be different to other 
businesses, including other loan users. 
Figure 4 shows the frequency of responses to whether businesses used formal business 
practices, as well as the use of cutting edge technology.  Several of these results were 
statistically significant, with differences evident among the subsamples and the highest 
reported incidence of adoption among the EFG group. Regular management accounts, a 
website for trading, formal business plan, written HR policy and adoption of cutting edge 
technologies were all statistically significant.  Some of these formal measures will be in 
                                            
28  Being a social enterprise is self-reported, and this definition may differ to other widely used 
definitions of social enterprise. 
response to a banks request for such practices, most notably a business plan to outline 
the purpose of loan funds, although adoption among EFG users was 15 percentage points 
higher than for other loan users. 
Figure 4 Use of formal business practices 
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Figure 5 shows the extent to which different types of business believed they had intensive 
competition from other businesses.  This could show possible displacement effects.  There 
were no significant differences between the three subsamples and the graph shows only 
small differences between the levels of intensity. 
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Figure 5 Competition in main markets 
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Figure 6 shows the extent of competition for different types of EFG businesses, 
considering the effects of sector on competition and six sectors are shown where sufficient 
sample sizes (n>25) existed.  The graph is perhaps best read by combining both very 
intense and intense competition, which identifies a clear difference for Hotels and 
restaurants as operating in a less competitive environment, followed by manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail.29   The other three sectors record very similar numbers, although 
construction has rather more responses of very intense competition.  
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29 The Hotels and restaurants sector is usually associated with being a highly competitive sector with a high 
business churn rate, so these findings appear to be counter intuitive.  For instance, ONS Business 
Demography 2010 statistics show the hotels and catering sector has the lowest 5 year survival rate of new 
business start-ups compared to all other sectors.  It is possible that EFG recipient businesses have either 
found a niche within the wider market or they under estimate the scale of competition they face in their 
sector. 
Figure 6 Competition in main markets by sector (EFG borrowers only) 
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2.5 Ownership Characteristics 
The main scheme administrative database captures information about businesses rather 
than owners, so the only information about the owners and directors of EFG businesses 
comes from the telephone survey.  In some respects the ownership characteristics are 
important to the business, inasmuch as younger owners may be less able to offer personal 
guarantees.  In other instances we are interested in ownership because it reveals whether 
EFG allows equal access to all types of owner. 
Table 8 shows the inclusiveness of EFG in terms of underrepresented owners.  The 
scheme does not specifically attempt to confer positive discrimination on underrepresented 
groups, but nor should there be any bias against these groups.  Survey evidence suggests 
that there are no significant differences between the subsamples in terms of female-led 
businesses and owners with a disability.  For ethnic minority led businesses (EMB), 
significantly lower proportions of EFG borrowers compared with the general SME 
population were ethnic minority led businesses (6 per cent compared to 11 per cent), 
although the opposite was reported by the SFLG study which indicated an 
overrepresentation of EMB.  Although the evidence from the survey seems to indicate that 
EMB businesses are under-represented, BIS recently estimated the whole EMB population 
to be just 6.3 per cent of SMEs, a proportion very close to the survey results.30  
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30 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/enterprise/docs/e/11-1077-estimates-women-
ethnic-minority-led-social-enterprises-in-uk.pdf 
Table 8 Inclusiveness of EFG for underrepresented owners 
 EFG % Non-borrowing comparison % 
Borrowing 
comparison % 
All business 
average 
Chi-squared 
significance 
Female-led 41.5 44.7 36.4 42.2 .200 
Ethnic 
minority-led 5.8 12.6 11.3 9.9 .005 
Disabled 8.4 8.8 8.8 8.7 .982 
Figure 7 shows the age profile of borrowers compared with the general population.  The 
proportions of older owners (55+) are relatively low for EFG clients (24 per cent), 
compared with other borrowers (31 per cent) and much lower than for the general SME 
population (37 per cent).  The results are statistically significant, and may suggest older 
business owners have greater access to collateral and track record and so will have less 
of a need for an EFG loan.   
Figure 7 Age profile of EFG users 
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Figure 8 shows the management experience of business owners.  The evidence suggests 
that EFG owners are somewhat less experienced than other business owners, which may 
in part be a corollary of the fact that it supports proportionately more young owners.  These 
results are statistically significant. 
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Figure 8 Management experience of owners 
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Figure 9 shows the qualifications of owners.  In the graph the differences appear very 
slight, especially when comparing proportions of degree educated owners.  However, 
there are some differences regarding the no qualifications category where the results are 
statistically significantly different with EFG borrowers being less likely to have no 
qualifications. 
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Figure 9 Qualifications of owners 
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There was no evidence of EFG borrowers being any more affected by the impacts of the 
recession than other businesses.  The telephone survey found that performance of all 
businesses was more subdued between 2007-2009, but EFG businesses performed no 
worse.  A more thorough econometric treatment of the effects of loans on business 
performance is shown in Section 5. 
Table 9 Sales change 2007-2009 and 2009-12 by borrowing status 
 Sales change 2007-2009 (%) Sales change 2009-2012 (%) 
EFG borrowers 8.4 33.4 
Non borrowers 10.1 24.7 
Other borrowers 6.7 35.2 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 In 2009, 6,724 businesses were offered an EFG loan to the value of £668m. 
 Changes to eligibility criteria over SFLG have made for a more inclusive scheme 
and allowed more businesses to participate, as well as making more finance 
available: 
 20 
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 Increasing the size of participating businesses above the £5.6m sales 
threshold to £25m turnover allowed a further 270 businesses to participate. 
 Increasing the size of loan from £250,000 to £1million enabled 525 
businesses to obtain additional finance. 
 EFG was accessed equally by different legal forms of business, but varied 
considerably by region and sector. 
 Survey evidence suggested that EFG businesses tended to be more likely to use 
formalised management practices than other businesses. 
 There was no difference among owner characteristics in terms of gender, or 
disability, but the owners of EFG recipient businesses may be less likely to be from 
an ethnic minority group and be a social enterprise.  Whilst ethnic minority groups 
and social enterprises are not specifically excluded from using EFG, it is unclear 
why uptake for these groups is lower.  EFG recipient businesses are also distinct in 
being run by slightly younger owners with fewer years of management experience. 
3 Customer Journey 
Respondents were asked a number of questions relating to seeking finance and the 
application process.  The section begins with a discussion of awareness of the EFG 
scheme and a consideration of finance alternatives and the extent to which EFG was part 
of an overall package of finance.  The role of the bank in obtaining EFG, the levels of 
satisfaction with the finance offer and interaction with lender is also covered. 
3.1 The Finance-Seeking Process 
3.1.1 Main Reason For Seeking Finance 
Figure 10 draws a comparison between EFG borrowers and other businesses, in terms of 
their main reason for seeking external finance.31  The results are very similar for many of 
the categories, with little observable variation between EFG recipients and non-users.  The 
one notable difference was for a greater proportion of other borrowers to seek finance for 
the purchase of an asset.  If anything, these results were rather more homogenous than 
the SFLG study, which found very substantial differences (e.g. for start-up SFLG users 
(57%), non-users (8%)). 
Figure 10 Main reason for seeking external finance 
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31  In practice businesses are likely to be seeking finance for multiple objectives and the 
questionnaire asked about the prevalence of all reasons, as well as for the main purpose. 
The questionnaire then asked a supplementary question probing for greater detail for the 
reason for seeking working capital.  There was interest in this area, because of the 
possibility that EFG was being used to support businesses that were not inherently 
sustainable.  Although the results are not statistically significant32, the observable results 
in Figure 11 show that EFG was rather more likely to reflect the positive reason of 
expanding the business, while reporting lower incidence of more negative reasons 
(temporarily falling sales, cover increased costs, covering late payment). 
Figure 11 Reason working capital was sought 
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3.1.2 Awareness of EFG scheme 
EFG recipients are more aware of EFG prior to approaching the bank than the 
borrowing comparison group.  EFG users and non-users were asked whether they were 
aware of the EFG scheme before approaching the bank for finance.  More than half of 
EFG users (53%) had heard of the scheme beforehand, compared with less than one third 
of non users (30%).  The pattern of replies was therefore as expected, indicating that the 
EFG recipients were more likely to have heard to the scheme before they applied to the 
bank.  It is unclear whether this was because they knew they were more likely to be the 
intended target group for the scheme and therefore more receptive to the offer of EFG or 
whether by having prior knowledge of the scheme, this influenced the lender to offer an 
EFG loan to the business.  There were no significant differences between the types of user 
accessing EFG in terms of size, age or sector, suggesting relatively even awareness, at 
least in terms of the recollection of the sample. 
Figure 12 shows where businesses heard about EFG, which is instructive in terms of 
informing continued publicity of the scheme, although to some extent these responses are 
associated with the launch, rather than current awareness.  Awareness through the media 
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32  χ2 p=0.06 
was the most likely source of information, for nearly one in five businesses.  Other sources 
of information were mentioned by less than one in ten businesses, with banks themselves 
being the next most important answer. 
Figure 12 Sources of information about EFG 
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3.1.2 Alternative sources of finance 
The majority of surveyed businesses indicated that they had no alternative sources of 
finance other than EFG.  18 per cent indicated that they had any alternative and less than 
4 per cent applied for an alternative. Table 10 shows the different alternatives that 
respondents indicated were available to them.  The percentages are for the whole sample 
of 500 EFG recipient businesses, rather than for those indicating they believed an 
alternative was available.  Consequently every row returns a low value because so few 
businesses believed there to be any alternative available to them. 
Where alternative sources of finance were available to EFG recipients, bank finance was 
reported to be the most frequent source.  Nearly half of those with an alternative claimed 
they could have obtained a different secured loan.  Banks were also popular, in terms of 
overdrafts and unsecured loans.  Only three applied for a secured loan and just two 
applied for the extension of an overdraft.  Only very small numbers (less than 1 per cent) 
had considered other options and very few of these options had been applied for.  This 
question did also highlight the extent to which personal resources (directors/family and 
friends) were considered and these informal sources of borrowing also received little 
interest. 
Table 10 Sources of finance  
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 Available Applied for 
A business bank loan – secured 8.6% 0.6% 
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An overdraft 3.2% 0.4% 
A business bank loan - unsecured 1.8% 0.0% 
Loans or equity from directors or shareholders 1.0% 0.2% 
Asset finance 1.0% 0.0% 
Business angel 0.8% 0.2% 
Loan unspec. Unsecured/secured 0.8% 0.0% 
Re-mortgaging 0.8% 0.0% 
Venture capital 0.6% 0.2% 
Factoring 0.6% 0.2% 
Stock finance 0.6% 0.0% 
Family and friends 0.4% 0.0% 
Leasing 0.4% 0.0% 
Investors unspec. inc. self-funding 0.4% 0.0% 
Government schemes 0.4% 0.0% 
Other 1.6% 0.0% 
In theory, EFG is designed to be lending of last resort with the BIS premium leading to 
EFG being slightly more expensive than conventional bank loans.  As such the low 
incidence of alternatives confirms the notion of this being finance of last resort in practice. 
To the extent that alternatives are mentioned there is the sense that EFG is part of 
package of finance that businesses assemble, rather than it being the sole constituent.  
The SFLG study found that the government backed scheme accounted for 48 per cent of 
the total finance raised. Indeed, for one quarter of businesses the loans accounted for less 
than 25 per cent of total finance.  This exact question was not asked in our 2012 survey, 
but if the evidence from Table 10 is correct then it would appear that EFG borrowers in 
2009 were extremely finance constrained. 
The early stage assessment conducted in 2009 (n=362) found that nearly 30 per cent of 
EFG borrowers were offered the full amount they sought by their lender.  The average 
proportion of their finance package from EFG was just 91 per cent, compared with 48 per 
cent for SFLG.  In this regard, the Early stage assessment corroborates our findings here, 
in that businesses appeared more constrained by the SME finance market in 2009, or 
perhaps that lending was better targeted on borrowers with no other finance options 
available, although either of these explanations serves to justify the fundamental rationale 
for the scheme. 
3.1.3 Number of loan applications 
Figure 13 shows the number of loan applications that had been made before a 
government guaranteed loan was secured.  For both EFG and SFLG it is evident that four-
fifths of successful applicants were directed towards the appropriate product for their very 
first application.  All types of company, both young and old, smaller and larger were 
equally successful in their first application.  Roughly one in ten of successful applicants 
under both EFG and SFLG had made two or more loan applications before being referred 
to the government backed loan.  It must also be remembered that previously unsuccessful 
attempts at borrowing may have resulted in developmental learning by businesses, such 
that a more robust business case was presented when the business finally succeeded. 
Figure 13 Number of loan applications before EFG secured 
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 3.2 The loan application 
3.2.1 The specific EFG application 
EFG was discussed early on in the application process.  Figure 14 shows that the 
possibility of a loan guarantee tended to be introduced into conversations early in the 
process for both EFG and SFLG loans.  For either scheme this occurred nearly three times 
out of four.  The implications of this timing are important because of the added element of 
the BIS premium of 2% associated with EFG and its consequences for borrowers in terms 
of the cost of finance.  These implications are most relevant where EFG was introduced as 
a possibility towards the end of the process.  Less than one quarter of businesses 
discussed EFG in the middle of discussions and less than one in ten businesses recalled 
that the lender did not discuss the possibility of a guaranteed loan until the end of the 
period.  There were no significant differences according to the age or size of businesses, 
with bank practices being consistent for all types of EFG client. 
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Figure 14 Point when EFG was first discussed with lender 
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3.3 Satisfaction with bank service 
EFG users and non-users who obtained a loan were asked to rate various aspects of the 
loan application process.  This section draws together evidence relating to the speed of 
borrowing, the levels of satisfaction and whether the conditions and service associated 
with the loan were appropriate to the business. 
3.2.3 Speed of bank reaching a decision 
Figure 15 shows the differences in response times for lenders under normal borrowing 
conditions and for EFG.  EFG borrowers report significantly longer times for lending 
decisions to be made.  This is especially apparent in timescales within 2-3 days, with 
nearly one-third of other borrowers claiming decisions were reached in fewer than three 
days, while just one in ten EFG recipients reported such speedy service.  Although a 
significant difference is evident across the distribution of answers, there is less difference 
in proportions reporting lending decisions of more than one month.  Since having readily 
available finance may be time critical for the business then longer borrowing times will 
have an adverse effect of businesses.  Further to this question, borrowers were asked 
what impact borrowing times had on their business (Figure 16).33 
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33  A 20-day EFG loan application processing target was introduced in August 2010. All the main lenders 
signed up to this commitment. The target starts when the lender has received all necessary information 
from the applicant for the credit application to be considered. If prior to the loan application, due 
diligence needs to be undertaken, the processing target will commence when the due diligence has 
been completed.       
Figure 15 Self-reported speed of bank lending 
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In total the time taken to make a decision was reckoned to have adversely affected trading 
for 20% of businesses.34  Figure 16 shows that longer lending decisions are more closely 
related to adverse impact on businesses, very much as one might expect.  For decisions 
taking longer than one month trading was believed to have been affected by more than 
half of businesses in the survey. 
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34  This figure may be prone to survival bias, as businesses experiencing lengthy delays may no longer 
be in business.  
Figure 16 Impact on business of lending decision time 
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Overall users of EFG tended to be satisfied with their loan.  Just over 70% of businesses 
recorded levels of fairly satisfied or very satisfied.  Figure 17 draws a comparison between 
levels of satisfaction for EFG and SFLG.  Ratings for SFLG were more positive in terms of 
reported satisfaction, but it is not clear that EFG users are experiencing actual lower levels 
of customer service from lenders, or instead are reporting negative sentiments about 
current banking practices.  Therefore, we cannot ascertain whether EFG itself is 
associated with inferior levels of satisfaction compared to the previous scheme. 
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Figure 17 Overall satisfaction with loan 
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The survey also asked questions about the degree to which borrowers received a careful 
explanation of what the scheme entailed and the extent to which banks made the 
borrowers commitments clear.   
Figure 18 shows more than 70 per cent of borrowers for both EFG and SFLG believed that 
the government guarantee had been fairly clearly or very clearly explained to them.   
Figure 18 Rating of clarity of explanation of guarantee by bank 
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A similar question asked whether banks had satisfactorily explained that EFG borrowers 
remained liable for the loan, but that the bank received a guarantee for the loan.  Seven 
out of every ten EFG borrowers believed that their bank had explained their 100% liability 
for the loan. 
The current level of the BIS premium remains set at the same level as 2009 at 2% per 
annum of the outstanding balance.35  Businesses are therefore exposed to a cost of 
finance including both the interest rate of the lending banks and the BIS premium and 
there may be some sensitivity among borrowers to the level of the BIS premium and 
overall cost of the finance. 
 
 
Figure 19 shows that an increase of the premium from 2% to 3% would discourage nearly 
one in four borrowers from having opted for an EFG loan.  If this finding reflects the actual 
behaviour of EFG borrowers36 then it is clear that the current 2% threshold does appear to 
be correctly set.  Only 14% of borrowers would have tolerated a rate in excess of 5%. 
It might seem reasonable that the responses are inversely related to the bank interest 
rates, so that those with the lowest tolerance to premium increases are exposed to the 
highest level of interest rates.  However this was not the case, with different tolerances 
to the BIS threshold all being subject to very similar interest rates and by analogy interest 
rates themselves would appear to have been set appropriately.  
 
Figure 19 Ceiling of BIS premium tolerated by EFG borrowers 
 
35  The BIS premium was temporarily discounted to 1.5% for premiums due and successfully collected in 
2009. It reverted to 2% from 1 January 2010. The temporary reduction reflected the particular issues 
faced by businesses at the time. 
36  Survey respondents may have an inherent incentive to reply with a lower figure than they would 
actually tolerate, especially if they may require an EFG backed loan in the future. 
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A further question asked whether EFG borrowers considered the BIS premium to be good 
value for money.  Nearly one quarter (23 per cent) said they believed the premium to 
represent poor value for money, compared with 2 in 5 businesses that believed the loan to 
be good value for money, with a sizeable one-third being ambivalent.  Evidently, a sizeable 
number of businesses believed the BIS premium did not represent good value for money, 
although these responses are somewhat contradictory when examining other variables.  
Non-Finance additional businesses chose EFG when a conventional loan was available, 
yet precisely the same proportion of these businesses believed the premium represented 
bad value for money. 
One further element of the terms of the loan was the length of time over which the loan 
was to be repaid.  Figure 20 shows the cumulative frequency of loans according to the 
term of the loan.  Overall, the graph shows very few loans over a short time horizon, with a 
tendency towards longer loans.  There are two noticeable steps in the increase in 
frequency, the first at 5 years and the second at 10 years and both of these account for 
nearly one-third of all clients.  Because the loan term is distributed in this manner the 
calculation of costs (Section 6) accounts for individual repayment schedules.   
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Figure 20 Cumulative percentage of loans by loan term 
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3.4 Sources of External Advice Used 
Businesses were asked whether they had used any external sources of information, 
advice or support to help them raise finance in 2009.  EFG borrowers were nearly twice as 
likely to have used external business support advice compared with other borrowers.  
While 36 per cent of EFG borrowers had used some external sources of information, only 
18 per cent of other borrowers were similarly inclined to do so.  Although the propensity to 
seek advice is clearly greater for the EFG borrowers, this still only applies in a minority of 
cases, with nearly two-thirds of the EFG group opting to use internal resources to solve 
problems.  This may explain why prior awareness of EFG was higher in the EFG user 
group compared to the other loan user comparison group.  
Figure 21 shows the main types of advice used by loan recipients, expressed as a 
percentage of all businesses.  The principal differences between EFG users and other 
borrowers was in terms of a much greater use of accountants and banks as a resource for 
support.  Other borrowers were slightly more likely to use Business Link or other 
consultants, but these differences were small.  Altogether, the use of types of support was 
very low compared with other surveys (e.g. SBS), but this question did ask specifically 
about the development of the business as opposed to operational support which often 
recognises the role of accountants as auditors and advisers. 
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Figure 21 Sources of advice 
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The survey also asked about the extent to which businesses themselves make plans for 
their future.  Businesses were asked whether they had a business plan in 2009 and 
whether that plan had been reviewed by a third party.  Table 11 shows that EFG 
businesses were more likely to have a business plan and for that plan to have been vetted 
by someone else and both these results are statistically significant. Taken together these 
results indicate that EFG businesses would appear to be better prepared than other 
borrowers in terms of planning for their future and in terms of seeking advice. 
Table 11 Business plans  
 Had a business plan in 
2009 
Business plan was 
reviewed by third party 
EFG RECIPIENTS 89.1% 65.1% 
Other loan users 76.7% 49.0% 
3.5 Conclusions 
There was little difference between EFG borrowers and other borrowers, in terms of the 
reason they were seeking finance.  However, there was some reported difference in prior 
awareness of EFG, which was higher among EFG users (53 per cent), compared with 
non-users (30 per cent). 
Alternative sources of funding were not considered by the majority of EFG recipient 
businesses.  Just 18 per cent believed they had an alternative to EFG, but less than 4 per 
cent had actually applied for other finance.  The earlier EFG Early assessment revealed 
that in 2009 EFG formed the majority of the finance deal with only 9 per cent of total 
finance raised coming from other sources.  This contrasted with the SFLG scheme in 
2006, where 52 per cent of the total finance raised came from other sources.  This 
suggests that the SME finance market had changed considerably in 2009 compared to 
 34 
 35 
The study did not consider aspects of customer service associated with borrowing, but did 
comment on two important areas of scheme design (the BIS premium) and operation (the 
speed of lending): 
 The speed of lending under EFG was reported to be slower than for SFLG.  Nearly 
half of other borrowers (47.6 per cent had to wait up to one month for their loan, 
compared with 62.6 per cent of other borrowers.  Longer waiting times had 
implications for businesses and 51 per cent of businesses were affected for 
decisions taking more than one month.  This may no longer be an issue due to 
policy changes introduced in August 2010. 
 The majority of businesses believed that the BIS premium was set at an appropriate 
level.  Substantial numbers (38 per cent) believed that a rate of 3 per cent was too 
high and therefore that the existing rate of 2 per cent was tolerable and any higher 
rate would have deterred them from participation.  However, since the 2 per cent 
premium represents an additional cost of finance 23 per cent of EFG users believed 
that the BIS premium represented poor value for money. 
EFG recipient businesses were better prepared than other businesses for their loan, in 
terms of being more likely to have a business plan and having had this plan vetted by a 
third party. 
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4 Finance and Project Additionality 
This chapter presents the findings from the evaluation survey which addresses the key 
issues of finance additionality37 and project additionality38 which is important for assessing 
the net impact of the scheme. This evidence mainly relates to EFG recipients, rather than 
other borrowers or the general SME population.  This is because we want to demonstrate 
the extent to which activity is additional in order to determine an accurate set of benefits 
for the scheme for the Cost Benefit Analysis.  It is also important to establish the extent to 
which EFG recipient businesses were credit rationed in terms of their ability to access 
conventional bank loans, the process by which businesses ended up with an EFG loan, 
and the nature of any potential impacts had they not been able to access a loan. 
It should be acknowledged that the results associated with finance and project additionality 
are based on the self-reported perceptions and recall of borrowers, rather than 
representing the views of lenders.39 This point is especially relevant when reporting on 
business perceptions concerning the views of their lender, particularly with regard to 
collateral or track record.  
4.1 Finance additionality 
4.1.1 Finance additionality: Ability to get a loan without EFG 
A large majority of businesses would not have received a loan from their bank if it was not 
for EFG.  Finance additionality is an important issue in the context of the rationale for EFG 
as it is not meant to replace normal commercial lending. On this, the results suggest only 6 
per cent of EFG borrowers indicated that their bank would have given them a loan without 
EFG, and a further 13 per cent suggested that this was a probable outcome.  In total 82 
per cent of EFG loans are additional and only 18 per cent of EFG businesses are non-
additional, although it is not possible to assess whether business owners’ judgement was 
correct about being able to access conventional loans. Interestingly, no significant 
differences were apparent by age of business, or industry sector and size of business. 
The level of finance additionality is broadly similar to the SFLG scheme, but is higher, 
possibly reflecting the tighter financing conditions in 2009.  The 2009 SFLG study 
indicated additionality of 79%, suggesting that the views of businesses on lender practices 
are much the same under EFG. 
The survey also asked unconstrained businesses why they chose EFG, rather than opting 
for other finance for which they were eligible.  Figure 22 shows that most responses were 
related to the superiority of the EFG offer, either in terms of better terms (e.g. less 
 
37 Finance additionality refers to whether finance is available from other commercial sources.  
The provision of finance that is not additional from other sources may be seen as a waste of 
scarce resources available to the government since it would have occurred in the absence of 
the programme. 
38 Project additionality refers to whether the project would have happened at all, its scale, scope 
and timing in the absence of funding. 
39  For every EFG loan made, lenders have to declare that the loan is additional and would not be 
made under their normal lending criteria. 
collateral), lower fees and interest rates, quicker access to finance and the availability of a 
larger amount of finance.  This may suggest for a small proportion of borrowers (6 per 
cent), the business may have chose to withhold offering security or offered less security to 
the bank. 
Figure 22 Reasons why unconstrained businesses chose EFG 
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Finance non-additional businesses might reasonably be considered to be more robust 
businesses with better prospects for the future, since lenders were offering other options, 
while EFG finance additional businesses had previously struggled to find borrowing 
opportunities and could be considered to be riskier propositions with possibly lower future 
growth prospects.  The survey evidence did not support the fact that finance additional 
businesses performed any better after EFG support.  Table 12 shows that finance 
additional businesses did tend to ask for proportionately slightly more finance related to 
their sales, while growing by rather less than the non-additional businesses.  The small 
number of businesses reporting they definitely had access to other finance had grown by 
the largest amount.  
Table 12 Finance additionality and business performance  
 Sales change 2009-12 Loan value/sales (%) 
Yes definitely 54.8% 11.8% 
Yes probably 14.9% 7.7% 
Possibly 31.8% 8.1% 
Probably not 25.1% 7.6% 
Definitely not 36.9% 8.9% 
Finance additional 24.5% 8.7% 
Finance non-additional 32.8% 8.3% 
 
Reasons given for taking out an EFG loan 
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Figure 23 records interviewee recollection of the reasons banks offered for EFG being 
appropriate.  Nearly one sixth of businesses indicated that no reason was forthcoming.  
Lenders are required to explain the EFG scheme to applicants and provide applicants with 
written details, including information on the additional premium paid to BIS.40  However, 
the majority of surveyed users indicated that one or more reasons were cited by the bank 
to explain why they represented a higher category of risk to the lender.  Nearly one half of 
the businesses indicated that the reason was a lack of security, in that they had exhausted 
their collateral on existing loans.  One third of the businesses indicated a lack of security at 
starting out.  Quite naturally, some of the younger businesses were told they lacked 
sufficient security for mainstream lending, while older businesses were often directed 
towards EFG because they had already exhausted their collateral due to existing loans.  
Insufficient track record was mentioned by nearly one in five businesses and the riskiness 
of the business plan was reported by 12%.  The most striking difference was for the type of 
sector and riskiness of the sector, where other businesses41 (42%) were very much more 
likely to have been offered this explanation than production (18%) and services (20%).  
Overall, the reasons were more closely associated with collateral, rather than the riskiness 
of the trading position of the business and its future prospects. 
An investigation into the actual interest rates corroborates these results to a degree.  
Those businesses that may be regarded as non-additional had an interest rate of 5.50 per 
cent, compared with 5.46 per cent for the finance additional businesses.  This marginal 
difference suggests that banks regard the prospects of both groups with the same degree 
of risk.  A more telling difference emerged from the results associated with the availability 
of collateral.  The non-additional businesses indicated that they had collateral in 62 per 
cent of cases, compared with just 47 per cent of finance additional businesses.  In total the 
non-additional business had in total nearly three times more collateral than they needed, 
compared with just 36 per cent of finance additional businesses. 
 
40  This information is produced automatically through the EFG Portal which is used to process EFG loan 
applications.   
41  Other businesses covered the Standard Industrial Classifications A (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing) 
and F (Construction)  
Figure 23 Reasons offered by bank for taking out an EFG loan 
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Taken together, all the rows of Figure 23 would seem to indicate that banks had good 
reason to offer EFG, regarding the surveyed users as ideal candidates for a scheme 
targeted at businesses that posed slightly greater risks than might be considered under 
normal lending. 
Availability of collateral 
In addition to considering the headline result of finance additionality, there is value in 
exploring the underlying collateral and track record to understand whether EFG and other 
borrowers were distinctively different in this regard. 
The proportion of EFG businesses with collateral was significantly lower, with only 49 per 
cent, compared with 78 per cent of other borrowers.  Figure 24 shows the amount of 
collateral available from EFG businesses was also significantly lower.  EFG borrowers 
were proportionately more likely to only have smaller amounts of collateral, with 20 per 
cent of EFG borrowers only able to call on amounts up to £25,000, whereas for other 
borrowers just 8 per cent had such a low limit.  At the upper end of the distribution there 
were proportionately fewer EFG borrowers, with just 16 per cent being able to access 
more than £250,000, compared with 32 per cent of other borrowers. 
The value of collateral available is of course only an issue where the value of the loan 
exceeds the available collateral and such an excess was evident in 53 per cent of EFG 
borrowers.  For those seeking more money than they could guarantee, the amount sought 
was three times the level of collateral available. 
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Figure 24 Value of collateral available to borrowers 
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Figure 25 shows the type of collateral available to borrowers, in terms of the proportions of 
borrowers with that option available to them.  The overall pattern is that EFG businesses 
are much more likely to resort to personal forms of collateral, while other businesses have 
more business collateral.  Nearly 40 per cent of other businesses could offer collateral in 
the form of business premises, compared to just 20 per cent of EFG borrowers and this 
difference was statistically significant.  Just over one-third of EFG borrowers could provide 
a form of other personal collateral, compared with just 20 per cent of other businesses and 
this difference was statistically significant.   
Because the first five columns represent multiple categories, a clearer picture is evident by 
considering whether collateral was exclusively business, personal or both possibilities.  
Two thirds of other loan businesses would resort to business collateral only, while this 
figure was just under 30 per cent for EFG borrowers.  More than half (55 per cent) of EFG 
borrowers could only offer personal collateral, compared with just over one-quarter (27 per 
cent) of other businesses.  More than twice as many EFG borrowers (16 per cent) could 
provide business and personal collateral (7 per cent).  Interpreting the figures it is likely 
that the difference arises not from the fact that other borrowers lack personal collateral, 
simply that since they are able to provide business collateral relatively easily, there is no 
need to resort to personal collateral.  For EFG borrowers the story is also clear, but here 
there are so few businesses with sufficient business collateral, that there is nothing left but 
to offer personal collateral. 
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Figure 25 Type of collateral available to borrowers 
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Figure 26 shows different aspects of business practice that indicate pressure on cashflow 
and ability to meet demands from creditors.  Nearly half of EFG businesses (46 per cent) 
had at least one such difficulty, compared with just over 30 per cent for other borrowers 
and 39 per cent for other SMEs.  For many of the individual factors EFG is no worse than 
other businesses and most of the overall difference stems from a greater use of HMRC 
time to pay scheme.42 
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42  It is unclear what is driving this result. Whilst it is possible that the using time to pay scheme may have 
highlighted the existence of EFG, it is probably explained by factors that influence the use of the Time 
to pay scheme also influence the likelihood of using EFG, e.g. use of accountants. 
Figure 26 Credit worthiness of businesses 
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4.2 Project additionality 
For a majority of businesses their loan was critical to them in terms of starting up in 
the first place or making the specific investment they sought funding for.  Figure 27 
shows that a majority of EFG borrowers and other borrowers would have not proceeded 
with their project in the absence of their loan.  Over 30 per cent of EFG borrowers would 
have definitely not have proceeded and a further one in five of EFG borrowers would 
probably not have proceeded.  This compares with just over half of other borrowers not 
proceeding without their loan and one in six probably not proceeding.  These results are 
similar to the SFLG study, but with a more determined guarantee scheme group that would 
still attempt to progress their projects and a more wary control group of other borrowers. 
The only difference by type of business was by sector, where businesses in the “other” 
sector were more confident, while production and especially services businesses were 
more restrained and cautious.  Only 18 per cent of other businesses would have not gone 
ahead, compared with 44 per cent of production businesses and 55 per cent of service 
businesses. 
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Figure 27 Project additionality – would you have gone ahead?  
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Project additionality: Timing  
EFG is helping businesses to start their investments earlier.  For those businesses 
that would have started their projects in the absence of funding they were asked about the 
timing of their project and whether they would have started sooner or later.  Without EFG 
nearly half of businesses projects would have been carried out later.  Amongst all 
borrowing businesses, only three per cent would have gone ahead with their project at an 
earlier date in the absence of their loan, 49 per cent at a later date, and 49 per cent at the 
same time.  Comparison businesses would appear to have been less deterred in terms of 
timing, but it is to be remembered that fewer of these businesses would have chosen to 
progress at all. 
Table 13 When would you have started your project?  
EFG RECIPIENTS Other loan users  
Earlier 2.5% 0.0% 
Later 49.1% 36.5% 
At the same time 48.5% 63.5% 
Project additionality: Scale  
Businesses may also have looked to change the scale of their business plans if they had 
not been able to secure EFG finance.  The EFG Early Assessment, therefore, in addition 
to questions about timing, asked those respondents who indicated they would have gone 
ahead with their original business plans in the absence of EFG about how they thought it 
would have impacted on the scale of these plans. 
Many respondents indicated that they would have found it difficult, if they still planned to 
move forward, to reduce the scale of their investment – for example, those intending to 
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buy an existing business or expand their premises – while others would have found this 
less of a challenge.  This is reflected in the results shown in Table 14.  Respondents were 
equally split between those who would have endeavoured to maintain their investment 
plan at the same scale as previously planned, and those who would have reduced the 
scale.  Very few would have increased the scale of investment.  Of those who would have 
reduced the scale of their investment, over 40 per cent would have reduced it by 25 per 
cent or more, indicating that EFG facilitated substantially higher levels of investment.  
Table 14 Changes to investment plans in the absence of EFG 
Change to scale of plan % respondents 
Larger 2.6 
The same scale 48.7 
Smaller 48.743 
Up to 10% smaller 4.6 
11-25% smaller 11.8 
26-50% smaller 14.5 
51-75% smaller 3.9 
More than 75% 2.6 
Additionality:  current scale of business operations 
Without EFG funding, some businesses may have been forced to decrease the overall 
scale of their current operations, in addition to cutting any investment plans.  The majority 
of respondents (73 per cent) indicated that this was indeed the case, with around 20 per 
cent of all businesses reporting that the scale of their operations would have been at least 
halved (Table 15). 
Table 15 Change in scale of current operations in the absence of EFG 
Change in scale of operations % respondents 
No change 27.5 
Up to 10 % smaller 14.1 
11-25% smaller 16.6 
26-50% smaller 19.2 
51-75% smaller 6.4 
More than 75% 16.3 
4.3 Conclusion 
On balance, the findings suggest that the majority of EFG borrowing is finance additional 
to that which would have occurred in the absence of the scheme, and, for the most part, 
EFG appears to be functioning in the manner for which it is designed. That is to say it is 
allowing businesses without collateral and/or a substantive track record to access loans 
which they would not have received otherwise.  In terms of the relative balance of factors 
causing this market failure, the evidence suggests that simply being unable to offer 
                                            
43 48.7% of responses indicated smaller plans, but not all could say by how much (only 37.4% could provide 
an estimate). 
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security is much more prevalent than lack of track record as a reason for using the 
scheme. 
 Finance additionality was high, with only 18.4 per cent of EFG borrowers able to 
find alternative forms of finance.  However, of those with alternative sources of 
funding available many of these businesses chose EFG because it was preferential 
to a conventional loan, offering better terms and conditions, or demanding less 
security. 
 EFG businesses tended to have less collateral available to them than other 
borrowers.  The median collateral for EFG was between £50,000 -£100,000, 
compared with £250,000 -£500,000 for other borrowers.  EFG borrowers were also 
more constrained in terms of the source of available capital, with 29 per cent able to 
offer business assets as collateral, while 66 per cent of other borrowers had 
business assets available as collateral.  
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5 Impact of EFG on Business 
Performance 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section of the report evidence is presented on the benefits of the scheme on 
individual business performance.  This includes the prevalence of self-reported benefits in 
the sub-samples, as well as the more objective measures of actual business performance 
(sales, employment, productivity, exports and profit). 
For the first part of the analysis (Section 5.1) our discussion concerns the differences 
between EFG borrowers and other borrowers, in terms of the extent to which they attribute 
changes in their business to their EFG loan.  Respondents were asked a series of eight 
related questions: 
 Impact on employment 
 Impact on sales 
 Impact on survival 
 Introduction of new or improved products or services 
 Increased productivity (value added per employee) 
 Introduction of new or improved processes 
 Reduced costs 
 Starting or increasing exporting 
This is followed by other questions which are also self-reported, but are phrased differently 
to elicit more particular responses concerning effectiveness, rather than recording the 
prevalence of phenomena.  Accordingly they are ordinal variables, giving a sense of how 
fully progress has been made towards improvements in assisted businesses, with 
responses varying from low to high intensity.  The first three measures are again drawing 
comparisons between borrowers, while the latter three make comparisons between both 
groups of borrowers and the unassisted control group. 
 Contribution of loan to existing business outcomes 
 Contribution of loan to future growth prospects 
 Contribution of loan to survival prospects 
 Introduced new or improved products or services 
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 Introduction of new processes 
 Future growth intentions 
This is followed by a second type of analysis which assesses changes in key business 
metrics.  Our survey recorded a baseline position in the year of receiving the loan (2009) 
and a follow-up three years later (2012).  These reported figures are based on observed 
differences between the two periods and give an accurate impression of the changes 
among the subsamples, rather than being based on more subjective self-reported 
measures.  The variables we will consider here are: 
 Employment change (2009 to 2012) 
 Sales turnover change (2009 to 2012) 
 Productivity change (2009 to 2012) 
 Profitability and change in profits (2009 to 2012) 
 Likelihood of exporting and export change (2009 to 2012) 
Within each of these respective sections (5.3.1-5.3.5), the weighted descriptive statistics 
are reported first, followed by econometric analysis to assess whether obtaining an EFG 
loan explained these changes. 
5.2 Self-reported business benefits 
Figure 28 shows the extent to which loan recipients believed that they had experienced 
benefits directly as a result of having received their loans.  The immediate pattern that 
emerges is that a greater proportion of EFG recipients report benefits compared with other 
loan users.  As well as there being observable differences, some were also statistically 
significant.  Changes to employment, sales, business survival and exporting all exhibit a 
significant difference between the EFG loan group and the comparison group of other 
borrowers. 
Four out of five EFG businesses report experiencing some benefits in terms of increased 
employment, sales, as well as enabling the business to survive.  For other loan recipients 
the figures are nearly ten percentage points lower.  For both groups these three measures 
stood clear as the most prevalent self-reported benefits.  New or improved products or 
services were referred to by just over half of respondents, while increased productivity was 
mentioned by just under half.  Four out of ten indicated that they had introduced new or 
improved processes as a result of the loan.  Less than one third of businesses reported 
that they had reduced costs as a result of the loan.  Only a small minority of businesses 
reported increases in exporting.  
Figure 28 Frequencies of self-reported benefits  
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Figure 29 shows EFG borrowers were less than 10 percentage points likely to suggest 
they would have achieved similar outcomes as quickly.  The cumulative percentage of 
outcomes that would have been achieved for EFG was 54%, compared with 63% for other 
borrowers suggesting EFG enabled proportionately more outcomes than would have 
otherwise been possible. 
Figure 29 Contribution of loan to business outcomes  
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There was no observable difference between EFG and other borrowers, in terms of 
substantial differences in any of the three responses.  More than 60% of both types of 
borrowers attributed improved growth prospects to the loan, while just 5% and 3% of EFG 
and other borrowers, respectively, believed their prospects had worsened. 
Table 16 Contribution of loan to future growth prospects (post 2009)  
 Improved No change Worsened 
EFG RECIPIENTS 61.8% 33.1% 5.1% 
Other loan users 65.1% 31.8% 3.1% 
Both sets of results from EFG borrowers and other borrowers suggest that loans had 
contributed to better survival in 67% and 60% of cases, respectively.  Survival prospects 
for EFG had improved more than for other borrowers.  Only a minority of businesses 
believed that their prospects had worsened.  These results corroborate the findings shown 
in Figure 28, albeit that a differently worded question yielded slightly lower proportions of 
support for EFG as having helped survival.  
Table 17 Contribution of loan to survival prospects (post 2009)  
 Improved No change Worsened 
EFG RECIPIENTS 66.8% 28.1% 5.1% 
Other loan users 59.9% 36.4% 3.7% 
All Borrowing businesses were more likely to introduce new or improved products and 
services.  Only 48% of non-borrowers had introduced new products and services, 
compared with nearly 70% of borrowers.  Just over one quarter (26%) of borrowing 
businesses had introduced new products or services, compared with 18% of non-
borrowers.  There was only a marginal difference (four percentage points) between 
borrowers and non-borrowers in terms of improved products and services.  For both 
improved products and services there was a nine percentage point difference between 
borrowers and non-borrowers.  There was little to separate borrowers from non-borrowers 
with regard to the introduction of new products or services.  
Figure 30 Introduced new or improved products or services  
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Both types of borrowing businesses were more likely to introduce new and improved 
processes into their businesses.  More than half of borrowers had introduced new products 
or services into their businesses, compared with just 38% of non-borrowers.  Few 
businesses (10 per cent or less) from any group indicated that they had only introduced 
new processes and it was rather more likely that they had introduced improved processes.  
While there are clearly demonstrable benefits to borrowing, the EFG exhibit a higher 
propensity (seven percentage points) to introduce new or improved processes than other 
borrowers. 
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Figure 31 Introduced new or improved processes  
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Borrowing businesses were more likely to state that they had growth objectives for the 
future.  Nearly three quarters of borrowers indicated that they wanted to grow their 
business in the future, compared with only half of non-borrowers.  EFG borrowers are 
rather more likely to suggest growth than other borrowers, particularly substantial growth.  
This question only asks about future growth, rather than making any attribution of these 
objectives to receiving the loan and consequently it may not be possible to say that this 
growth orientation is the result of receiving EFG. 
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Figure 32 Growth objectives (post 2012)  
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5.3 Economic performance 
Having considered how the EFG group compared to the borrowing comparison group on a 
variety of indicators of loan use, the focus of this section is on more tangible measures of 
business performance, albeit based on responses from a telephone survey rather than 
directly from filed accounts. The different metrics are first described and then analysed.  
For all these measures there are both growing and declining businesses and the 
descriptive figures show both, as well as the net position.  The descriptive statistics 
comment on the entire survey sample and do so for the purposes of comparison with the 
other two groups.  The findings use a three way weight to match EFG recipients against 
the comparison groups.  Section 7 should be consulted for information regarding the entire 
2009 cohort excluding deadweight and displacing businesses. 
Table 18 - Table 22 show breakdowns of change in some detail, reporting on the relative 
frequency of growth among the sample.  Actual change is disaggregated into increases 
and decreases to illustrate the scale of growth and contraction and then the net change is 
shown.  The relative change over 2009-2012 is also shown, with 2009 figures as the 
denominator. 
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In this section the analysis is also broadened to include a second comparison group of 
businesses who had not accessed any conventional bank loans.  An econometric model is 
used to determine the extent to which EFG compares with both these groups in terms of 
performance.  In addition to a descriptive analysis, a regression was performed for each 
measure of performance change (2009-12).  This analysis tests whether a number of 
business and owner characteristics were statistically significant and whether they 
explained the performance change.  Business characteristics included the size, sector, 
age of business, and social enterprise status, while owner characteristics were the age of 
owner and their years of experience and whether they were degree educated.  Holding all 
these factors constant allows an assessment of the net impact of EFG to be made, as 
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otherwise some of the performance differences could be explained by the different sector 
or age characteristics of the EFG recipient business. 
Summary of impact 
Controlling for business characteristics, no significant differences between EFG and 
other borrowers or non-borrowing businesses for any of the measures was found.  
Therefore, there is no evidence of EFG businesses being of a lower (or higher) quality 
than the back ground population of businesses. 
5.3.1 Employment change (2009-2012)44 
Table 18 shows the descriptive statistics for employment change across the period 2009-
2012.  The proportion of businesses increasing employment over the period was more 
than two thirds for all borrowers, while only 56 per cent for non-borrowers.  Other loan 
users appeared to fare slightly better than EFG users, with more respondents (five 
percentage points) indicating employment growth. 
Among businesses with employment gains, EFG businesses performed better than other 
businesses, increasing their employment base by 60 per cent, compared with an increase 
of less than half for other businesses.  However, this was compensated for by slightly 
larger losses among those businesses losing workers, such that the net position saw 
employment growth of just over 20 per cent for EFG recipients, compared with more than 
30 per cent for other borrowers, both outperforming non-borrowers who recorded growth of 
just 10 per cent. 
Table 18 Employment change (2009-2012)  
 EFG recipients Other loan users Non-borrowers 
Proportion businesses increasing 67.4 73.0 55.8
Proportion same/decreasing 32.6 27.0 44.2
Average increase % (weighted) 60.1 48.6 46.6
Average decrease % (weighted) -32.9 -26.3 -28.0
Net change % (weighted) 21.2 31.3 10.6
Average employment change 
(number of employees) 3.0 8.4 2.1
The regression (see Appendix 1) showed that there are no differences between the EFG 
recipients, other loan users and the non-borrowers in terms of employment change (2009-
2012), nor was the size of the loan important in explaining employment change.  However, 
the purpose of loan finance was a significant variable in explaining employment change.  
Loans granted for investment purposes grew by 20 per cent more than businesses 
seeking a loan for working capital. 
Additionally, a number of business and ownership characteristics were statistically 
significant in explaining employment change.  In particular younger businesses grew faster 
(those aged less than four years grew 24 per cent faster than those older than four years) 
                                            
44 Although these increases appear large during a period of negative and constrained economic growth 
between 2009 and 2012, they are not including employment (and sales) that are lost from businesses that 
have closed down.  It is worth noting that although the relative change is substantial, the absolute change is 
relatively small, with EFG businesses only gaining three additional employees on average. 
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and businesses with younger owners grew faster.45  Owners with degrees were also 
associated with higher growth (degree holding owners grew by more than 28 per cent, 
compared with owners without degrees). 
5.3.2 Sales change 
Table 19 shows that sales change had similarly high proportions of businesses improving 
as for employment in each subsample.  The distribution also follows a similar pattern, with 
non-borrowers reporting the lowest proportion (60 per cent), followed by EFG recipients 
(72 per cent) and other borrowers (78 per cent). 
The scale of sales change also follows the same pattern as for employment, helping to 
confirm the robustness of these findings.  Growing EFG businesses increased their sales 
by nearly 70 per cent, while other businesses grew their sales by roughly 50 per cent.  
However, EFG fared slightly worse in terms of lost sales and the net position showed very 
little difference between EFG borrowers and other borrowers, although both were nearly 
ten percentage points ahead of non-borrowers. 
Table 19 Sales change (2009-2012)  
 EFG recipients Other loan users Non-borrowers 
Proportion businesses increasing 71.7 78.2 60.7
Proportion same/decreasing 28.3 21.8 39.3
Average increase % (weighted) 69.1 52.4 48.7
Average decrease % (weighted) -24.5 -20.3 -20.3
Net change % (weighted) 33.4 35.2 24.7
Average Sales change £402,000 £525,000 £379,000
The regression model (see Appendix 1) showed no differences between the EFG 
recipients, other loan users and the non-borrowers in terms of sales change (2009-2012), 
nor was the size of the loan important in explaining changes in sales.  However, the 
purpose of loan finance was a significant variable in explaining sales change.  Loans 
granted for investment purposes grew by 22 per cent more than businesses seeking a 
loan for working capital. 
Additionally, a number of business and ownership characteristics were statistically 
significant in explaining employment change.  In particular younger businesses grew faster 
(those aged less than four years grew 41 per cent faster than those older than four years) 
and businesses with a younger owner grew faster.  Owners with degrees were also 
associated with higher growth (degree holding owners grew by more than 16 per cent, 
compared with owners without degrees). 
5.3.3 Labour productivity growth46 
A majority of businesses have experienced increases in productivity between 2009 and 
2012 for each subsample, with a slightly lower proportion of EFG borrowers reporting 
productivity growth, compared with other businesses.  Productivity gains themselves are 
                                            
45  All older owner-manager age groups reported a negative co-efficient, with those in the 45-54 age 
group particularly less disposed to growth. 
46  This study uses a crude measure of labour productivity estimated by dividing sales by number of 
employees.   
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most substantial among the EFG group (more than £10,000 per employee per business) 
higher than other borrowers at -£13,000 per employee per business.  While employment 
change among other borrowers was strong, sales growth was relatively weak and 
consequently productivity in some other borrowers had fallen over time. 
Table 20 Labour productivity change (2009-2012)  
 EFG recipients Other loan users Non-borrowers 
Proportion businesses increasing 55.1 60.7 63.9
Proportion same/decreasing 44.9 39.3 36.1
Average increase % (weighted) 63.3 26.8 50.3
Average decrease % (weighted) -36.2 -28.1 -35.9
Net change % (weighted) 8.5 -9.7 7.3
Average productivity change £10,500 -£13,200 £8,000
The regression analysis showed only one variable is statistically significant and that is the 
age of the business.  Younger businesses saw a larger change in productivity compared to 
older businesses. Businesses aged more than 4 years old in 2009 had a £29,189 lower 
change in productivity compared to younger businesses aged up to 4 years old. There are 
also no differences between the EFG recipients, other loan users and the non-borrowers in 
terms of the labour productivity levels (2009-2012).  This indicates that there is no 
evidence that EFG businesses are less productive than comparable borrowing 
group of businesses in 2012 or 2009. This is an important finding as it suggests EFG is 
not being used to support inferior quality businesses. 
5.3.4 Exporting intensity 
The first row of Table 21 shows the proportion of businesses exporting in 2012, revealing 
very little difference between EFG businesses and others.  Comparison between 
subsamples is hampered by a lack of observations in 2009 for other borrowers. However, 
there are rather more observations for EFG businesses and non-borrowers, making these 
estimates more reliable.   
EFG exporters did appear to have improved very substantially, with two-thirds improving 
and the relative change in exports for EFG businesses as a whole was an improvement of 
55 per cent. 
Table 21 Changes in exporting (2009-2012)  
 EFG recipients Other loan users * Non-borrowers 
% exporters (2012) 23.6% - 20.1%
Proportion businesses increasing 68.4% - 50.0%
Proportion same/decreasing 31.6% - 50.0%
Average increase % (weighted) 276.4 - 207.7
Average decrease % (weighted) -78.9 - 56.2
Net change % (weighted) 55.1 - 40.0
Average exports change £279,000 - £227,000
* Fewer than five observations 
The regression analysis indicated two variables are statistically significant: size and the 
dummy variable of owner managers aged 45 to 54 years old.  Owner managers aged 45 to 
54 years old saw a £650,689 lower change in exporting intensity compared to those owner 
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managers aged up to 44 years old.  In other words, the owner-mangers aged 45 to 54 
years old performed worse than the younger owner-managers.  A unit change in size saw 
a £46,261 change in exporting.  Thus, the larger the size of the firm is associated with 
greater positive changes in exporting.  There are no differences between the EFG 
recipients, other loan users and the non-borrowers in terms of change in exporting (2009-
2012). 
5.3.5 Profitability 
Three quarters of businesses reported a profit in 2012, with a profit ratio of approximately 
10 per cent.  More EFG businesses had improved profits than other borrowers or non-
borrowers.  The absolute and relative increase in profits was one area where other 
businesses outperformed EFG, growing average profit and increasing it more compared 
with the 2009 baseline. 
Table 22 Changes in profitability (2009-2012)  
 EFG recipients Other loan users Non-borrowers 
% reporting profit (2012) 76.0% 71.7% 76.5%
profit ratio47 (2012) 10.7% 8.7% 12.8%
Proportion businesses increasing 61.3 51.5 43.1
Proportion same/decreasing 38.7 48.5 56.9
Average increase % (weighted) 1427 367 244
Average decrease % (weighted) -147 -166 -366
Net change % (weighted) 127 235 -128
Average profits change £48,000 £72,000 £61,000
Only one variable is statistically significant in explaining change in profitability with the 
regression model.  Owner managers aged 45 to 54 years old reported a £121,033 lower 
change in profits compared to owner-managers aged up to 44 years old.  There are no 
differences between the EFG recipients, other loan users and the non-borrowers in terms 
of the change in profitability (2009-2012). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The analysis covering the self-reported descriptions of impact suggested EFG users 
believed they had benefitted more from their investment of finance than other borrowers.  
A greater proportion of EFG users indicated they believed the loan had contributed to 
increased employment, sales and the chances of survival, compared with non-borrowers, 
although slightly lower than for other borrowers. 
Although the descriptive analysis suggested that there were benefits for EFG over and 
above non-borrowers, these results proved not to be significant in the econometric models 
testing for business performance improvements.  The returns from EFG loans were 
generally positive, but in no scenario were they statistically significant, in contrast to the 
findings from the SFLG study which found there to be benefits shared by all borrowers, 
including EFG users.  The significant explanatory factors for growth were other reasons 
such as the age of business, age of manager, rather than the source of finance. One 
policy-relevant finding was that loans for investment were significantly more likely to be 
                                            
47 This figure is the profit ratio (profit divided by turnover) in 2012, rather than changes in the profit ratio. 
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associated with employment and sales growth, compared with loans primarily used for 
working capital. 
Ultimately these results suggest that EFG users are no different to the comparison groups 
in terms of performance.  Where there may be concern that the scheme is supporting 
weaker or failing businesses this is not proven by the evidence, although neither can it be 
seen that lenders are backing superior quality businesses.  Where the difference lies is in 
terms of access to finance, and in particular availability of collateral.  It can be considered 
that EFG is allowing credit constrained businesses to operate on a level playing field with 
businesses that can access conventional loans due to the availability of collateral.  
Furthermore, due to the high level of finance additionality (reported in Section 4), EFG can 
be seen as correcting a market failure, by allowing businesses that may be credit rationed 
due to lack of collateral to access the finance they need. 
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6 Exchequer Costs 
This section presents the costs to the Exchequer of operating the EFG scheme for the 
2009 cohort, based on actual known values (size of the loan fund, number of borrowers, 
borrowing term, default rates and recovery rates) from BIS Management Information 
systems.  These figures therefore relate to the entire population of EFG borrowers in 2009, 
rather than an estimate based on the survey sample.  The final cost involves the cost of 
loan defaults and administration of the scheme, offset by the income from the BIS 
premium.  Each of these elements are discussed separately below.   
In order to arrive at a cost for the scheme for EFG loans taken out in 2009 we are limiting 
the analysis to a period up to January 2012, choosing to synchronise the costs presented 
with the benefits which are derived from the January 2012 survey.  Calculations for 
defaults and the BIS premium income relate to outstanding balances based on loan terms 
specific to individual borrowers (i.e. 3 months to 10 years).   
6.1 Defaults  
The main cost to the Government of operating EFG is meeting the cost of loan defaults.  
Although the government guarantee for individual loans stands at 75 per cent of the 
outstanding balance, there is a cap on default payments for the scheme set at 9.75 per 
cent of the lending amount.  Once the cap is exceeded then the government is in effect 
bearing no more of the risk and any further risk falls entirely on lenders.  This is a change 
from the previous SFLG scheme where the government covered 75% of the outstanding 
balance of all the loans that defaulted. 
A cohort of EFG loans drawn down between January and June 2009 was taken from BIS 
Management Information to assess the proportion defaulting over each quarter of the life 
of the loan.  Figure 33 shows the cumulative survival profile of EFG loans drawn down in 
this period.  From this profile it is possible to estimate the cost of defaulted EFG loans 
drawn down in 2009, in the first three years of the scheme, up to January 2012 and use 
these in the cost benefit calculations.48 
The three lines on the graph show the surviving proportions of the number of EFG loans, 
their monetary value and the number of SFLG loans over a similar timescale.  After 3 
years (12 quarters), 72 per cent of the EFG loans had not defaulted, which stands at a 
higher level than under the SFLG scheme.  However, comparability is hampered by the 
fact that EFG and SFLG operated with different terms and conditions for participating 
businesses and with different prevailing economic conditions. 
Given that the economic conditions are more difficult in the current environment than when 
SFLG was operating, a lower default rate under EFG is surprising.  This may reflect 
changes in the design of the policy compared to SFLG.  For instance, the Government cap 
on lender default payments may encourage lenders to better target EFG at viable 
businesses.  Alternatively the ability for lenders to take security under an EFG loan may 
 
48  Because funds were drawn down over a period of six quarters (January-March 2010 to April-June 
2011), the presentation of costs includes eight quarters of information, although these timings are not 
synchronised.  
also help to discourage businesses from defaulting.49  However, despite a lower default 
rate than by historical standards it is clear that EFG default rates are considerably higher 
than commercial SME lending and represent lending to riskier businesses.  Whilst it is 
difficult to get comparable data on commercial loan default rates, it is suggested that, 
typical default rates on secured lending are less than 3% on a corporate loan book, and 
slightly higher on loans to SMEs at around 4%.50 
A more accurate picture of the financial liability of defaults comes from focusing on the 
monetary value of defaults.  The fact that there are proportionately lower defaults in terms 
of monetary value than the numbers of loans indicates that it is smaller loans that are 
defaulting. 
The estimated nominal gross default cost of the EFG loans drawn down in 2009 that did 
not survive until January 2012 is £104.2m, with government exposure to 75 per cent of this 
amount being £78.1m, but capped at £65.3m.51 
Figure 33 EFG Loan survival profile 
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Source: BIS Management Data 
There are also some administration costs represented by the management of the scheme 
by Capital for Enterprise Ltd (CfEL).52  These costs are recurrent for every year for the 
 
49  SFLG default rates were also higher when the five year rule was in operation, which excluded older 
businesses from being able to use SFLG.  
50  Graham Review of the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme Interim Report 2004 
51  The Government guarantee covers 75% of the value of the remaining loan value, capped at a level of 
9.75% of the aggregate total from all borrowers. 
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52  CfEL is the arms length body responsible for delivering EFG on behalf of BIS. 
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whole of the scheme and as such each year represents the costs of that cohort.  It is 
estimated that the 2009 cohort incurred administration costs of around £800,000 over the 
life of the EFG loan.  This is made up of Capital for Enterprise (CfEL) staff costs (including 
wages, pensions, employer National Insurance Contributions and other staff costs 
including training, travel and subsistence), IT, building, legal costs and also costs in 
operating the portal required for delivering the scheme. 
6.2 Recoveries and BIS premium 
Not all loan defaults necessarily represent the full value of their outstanding balance 
written off and in some cases it is possible to recover some or all of the outstanding funds.  
Recoveries and security realisations are attempted by banks before an EFG default claim 
is submitted to BIS.  They are therefore not included in the Exchequer cost calculations.53 
To offset some of the costs of operating EFG, BIS charges an annual premium of 2 per 
cent per annum, paid quarterly on the outstanding balance for every period of trading.  As 
such the premium income is earned for every period where the business does not default.  
The income stream from the BIS premium also ceases in the advent of early repayments.  
The total of premium income for the twelve quarters after loans were drawn was £22.1m. 
6.3 Summary of Exchequer costs 
Table 23 shows the costs for each of the elements discussed above.  The net costs of the 
scheme to Government are estimated to be £34.0m for the first three years after draw 
down of loans.  This is equivalent to a cost of £5,000 per supported business.  These costs 
only can be considered as interim as there are further defaults beyond the three year 
period considered, albeit at a considerably reduced failure rate, as well as further BIS 
premiums due for every quarter of survival.  Ultimately, these costs therefore overstate the 
relative costs of the scheme.  This is because costs are frontloaded with the majority of the 
defaults occurring in the early years of operation, but there is a continued income stream 
from the BIS premium occurring up to ten years. 
Table 23 Summary of net EFG costs to Exchequer (to December 2011)54 
 £ 
Cost of called in guarantees (55,573,000) 
Administration costs  (800,000) 
Premium income 22,705,000 
Net EFG Costs (33,669,000) 
Net costs per recipient business (5,000) 
Source:  BIS Management Data.  (Costs are in nominal terms) 
The income and expenditure directly associated with the scheme is set out in Table 23, 
but an alternative presentation is possible showing the indirect flow-backs to the 
                                            
53  For the 2009 cohort it is estimated that nearly £5.0m was recovered by lenders prior to claiming the 
Government guarantee. 
54  A comparison of this table for operation of the scheme for five years (2009-2013) is presented in 
Appendix 4 
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exchequer as a result of taxation and national insurance occurring as a result of increased 
employment.  This wider alternative scenario is shown in Appendix 3. 
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7 Economic Cost Benefit Analysis  
This section assesses the overall economic impact of EFG, and whether there is a welfare 
gain to the economy from operating the scheme.  For this to be the case, economic 
benefits must outweigh economic costs.  If this is not the case and economic costs are 
greater, there is an overall loss to the economy from operating the scheme. 
This section first identifies the economic benefits arising from a number of different areas:  
net jobs created and saved; net increase in sales (and GVA); net gains in productivity; net 
increase in export earnings, as well as making an assessment of the likely economic costs 
of operating the scheme. 
The following section (7.1) draws together both costs and benefits in Table 24 to 
summarise the scale of impacts, as well as quantifying the benefits in a value for money 
measure relative to costs.  Section 7.2 explains the methodology used to produce these 
cost benefit figures and key assumptions used.  Section 7.3, shows the specific 
calculations undertaken.  Section 7.4 reviews the economic costs, which differ from the 
Exchequer cost by taking into account the opportunity cost of capital and lost resources 
through defaults from finance additional businesses. 
The main estimates shown all relate to the period from 2009 to 2012, as this is based on 
actual loan default rates and survey responses of actual additional business growth 
covering the same period.  A further scenario is shown in Appendix 2 which projects these 
results for a further two years to create a five year assessment.  These different 
approaches highlight the fact that costs of the scheme are somewhat frontloaded, where 
failing businesses default on loans create high costs in the early years, while in later years 
the value of loan defaults per year falls dramatically but the benefits are assumed to 
continue among surviving businesses. 
7.1 Headline impacts 
Table 24 shows the headline results for the whole section, bringing together all the results 
in summary form.  Each row shows the total benefit or cost, as well as signposting to the 
succeeding table in which the more detailed calculation of these figures is derived.  
Commentary on each of the tables appears next to that table. 
For every result EFG outperformed SFLG, but this is largely because the scale of lending 
is so much higher, with more than twice as many participating businesses in 2009.  For 
this reason, a more illuminating comparison can be made by comparing the average value 
per business and here too EFG outperformed SFLG on a large number of measures 
largely due to a lower level of defaults and slightly higher finance additionality figure.55 
As well as detailing the individual results from later subsections, Table 24 also shows the 
gross economic benefit, given by the Gross Value Added, as well as the economic costs.  
The estimated net impact for the scheme for three years was a net economic benefit of 
£1.1 bn showing a considerable net welfare improvement from the operation of the 
scheme. 
 
55 The SFLG CBA used a different methodology and so the CBA results are not directly comparable to this 
evaluation. 
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Table 24 Economic and cost benefits derived for whole EFG programme (Central 
Scenario) 
Item Estimated 
Total 
Per business
Net jobs created (excluding entrepreneur) (Table 25) 6,500 jobs 0.96 jobs 
Net Jobs saved (excluding entrepreneur) (Table 26) 12,400 jobs 1.84 jobs 
Net additional sales created (Table 27) £1344m £200,000 
Net additional Gross Value Added (jobs created) (Table 28) £567m £84,000 
Net additional Gross Value Added (jobs saved) (Table 29) £704m £105,000 
Net additional labour productivity (Table 30) £332m £49,000 
Net exporting (Table 31) £460m £290,000 
Gross Economic benefit (Table 28)  and (Table 29) £1,270m £189,000 
Economic costs ( 
 
Table 32 &Table 33 + admin. costs) 
£178m £26,500 
Net Economic Benefit (Table 34) £1,092m £162,000 
Net economic Benefit NPV (Table 34) £1,059m £158,000 
Societal Benefit Cost ratio (GVA created and saved) 7.1 - 
Public Money Benefit Cost ratio (GVA created 
and saved) 
16.4 - 
Net economic benefit per exchequer 
pound Benefit Cost ratio  
(GVA created 
and saved) 
33.5  
These figures relate to the 2009 cohort of 6,724 businesses.  Costs and benefits are for a duration of 2-3 
years, between the loan being offered and the survey point in early 2012. 
7.2 Methodology 
7.2.1 Background 
In calculating the costs and benefits to the economy from EFG, the analysis focuses on 
the period from January 2009 (when the first loans were made) to January 2012 (when the 
survey data was collected). This includes the contribution of EFG to the recipient 
businesses themselves, and the wider economy, assessing the performance change of 
businesses in the three years since receiving their loan. 
The economic evaluation assesses the net position for the economy, rather than 
considering the aggregated gross benefits for participating businesses.  There are two 
important considerations in terms of arriving at the net impact, namely the level of finance 
additionality and extent to which the growth of EFG supported businesses displaces other 
businesses in the economy.  Section 4 shows a proportion of EFG supported businesses 
could be categorised as deadweight as some indicated that other alternative sources of 
funding were available to them at the point at which they accessed their EFG loan.  The 
actual proportion of non-finance additional EFG borrowers was 18.4 per cent.   
Displacement was estimated using two standard questions in the telephone survey.  
Firstly, businesses were asked whether they competed with local and national firms and 
secondly they were asked whether if they ceased trading immediately, all of their sales 
would be taken up by a UK based company within one year. The number of businesses 
that indicated all their sales would be taken up by local competitors was 24.5 per cent.  
The combined figure for finance additional non-displacing businesses is such that either or 
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both of these conditions may be true and this estimates a net figure of 61.0 per cent for the 
sample. 
Having produced these net figures, further adjustments are necessary to accommodate 
the fact that not all businesses in the population have survived. Some 72.6 per cent of the 
earliest borrowing businesses in 2009 were still trading and 84.7 per cent of the latest 
draw downs were still trading.  The weighted average for survival was 75.6 per cent.  
While the costs for these businesses are included, none of the benefits are included, which 
underestimates the benefits as it fails to recognise some interim benefits among failed 
businesses. 
For each sets of calculations on business performance, figures from the questionnaire are 
used to estimate the degree to which interviewees believed the EFG loan was responsible 
for growth.  This attribution of impact recognises the fact that some of the change might be 
due to further injections of finance or other intervention in the intervening years, rather 
than solely recognising EFG as the sole contributor to changes in business performance. 
This method is slightly different to the previous SFLG evaluation, although follows the 
same convention of accounting for additionality, displacement etc which makes it largely 
comparable.  The difference is apparent in the 2009 SFLG evaluation macro approach of 
using average values for the benefit calculations.  This study uses a micro data approach 
of using individual survey responses on business growth for those businesses which are 
finance additional and are non-displacing.  I.e. the survey responses from businesses that 
could have obtained finance elsewhere or are likely to take sales away from other 
businesses in the economy are excluded from the following figures.  This approach is 
more accurate as there is less rounding errors, but does mean the business performance 
figures used in this section differ to those already presented in chapter 5.   
All figures in this section are presented having accounted for the effects of inflation to 
show their real value at the end of 2011 using the HMT GDP deflator.56  The economic net 
benefit figures in table 34 are then discounted using the HMT Green book rate of 3.5% to 
show their Net Present Value (NPV).   
7.3  Economic benefits 
7.3.1 Net jobs created and saved 
The gross estimated change in jobs from the survey evidence was 848 jobs, based on 137 
observations of non-displacing finance additional businesses for which attribution data was 
also available.  The level of attribution to the EFG loan for employment change was 68 per 
cent.  Table 25 shows additional deductions for failed businesses and non additional and 
displacing businesses, as well as increasing the sample estimate to represent the 
population as a whole.  These estimates indicate that the 2009 EFG cohort was 
responsible for the creation of 6,500 jobs, equivalent to 0.96 additional jobs per business. 
 
56 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/data_gdp_fig.htm 
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Table 25 Employment created  
Observations of employment change (A) 275 
Jobs created (B) 572 
Average jobs created i.e. B/A (C) 2.08 
Total EFG population (D) 6,724 
Surviving businesses (E) 75.6% 
Additional and non-displacing businesses (F) 61.0% 
Total change for EFG population 2009 (DxExF)x(B/A) 6,453 
Average jobs change per supported business 0.96 
The previous SFLG study produced a wide estimate with lower and upper bounds of 
between 3,550 and 6,340 extra jobs, an average of 4,945 jobs.  With 3,104 participating 
businesses in 2006 the scheme was responsible for creating 1.59 jobs per business.  Total 
jobs created were therefore lower for SFLG, because of the smaller scale of the scheme, 
although there was a relatively larger contribution per assisted business.57 
Table 25 only considers the attributed jobs gains, but EFG is also to be recognised as 
providing stability in businesses to help them retain staff and save jobs during the 
recession.  Table 26 repeats the above method for jobs saved produces a figure of 1,097 
additional non-displacing jobs saved for the sample (this is equivalent to 3.99 jobs saved 
per EFG recipient), translating into an estimated 12,375 jobs saved for the EFG population 
and 1.84 jobs per business after adjusting for survival and displacement.  Estimates of 
jobs saved are known to be somewhat overinflated and in this instance this would be 
equivalent to 28 per cent of the 2009 employment base.  Notwithstanding that this may be 
high with businesses overestimating the possible reduction in employment, it must be 
acknowledged EFG is likely to be responsible for saving a very substantial number of jobs 
that would otherwise be lost during the difficult economic conditions of 2009.   
Table 26 Jobs saved  
Observations of employment change (A) 275 
Jobs saved (B) 1,097 
Average jobs saved i.e. B/A (C) 3.99 
Total EFG population (D) 6,724 
Surviving businesses (E) 75.6% 
Additional and non-displacing businesses (F) 61.0% 
Total change for EFG population 2009 (DxExF)x(B/A) 12,375 
Average jobs change per supported business 1.84 
7.3.2 Net sales change 
Sales change over the period 2009-2012 was calculated using a different methodology to 
capture the benefits to the business of sales for all trading after the EFG intervention (i.e. 
                                            
57 The SFLG evaluation did not report on jobs saved. 
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2009, 2010 and 2011, rather than just the snapshot of the 2011 survey).  The starting point 
of sales change quoted in the survey was used to represent the sales for the twelve 
months of 2011, while there were up to a further two years of missing values to be 
estimated.58  Earlier years were profiled assuming that sales change was linear.  
Thereafter the process of additionality and attribution was repeated as above. 
There were 163 records in the sample which provided data for the attribution of sales and 
included cases where sales had increased, as well as others where sales had fallen.  
Some of these values were judged to be outliers that were upwardly inflating the total and 
the top 5 per cent of values were removed.   
Gross sales increases in 2011 were £69.5m, with estimates of £40.5m in 2010 and 
£11.4m in 2009.  The level of attribution quoted by the sample varied because of 
weightings in each year, but was always above 70 per cent.  Table 27 shows additional 
deductions for failed businesses and non additional and displacing businesses.  These 
estimates indicate that the 2009 EFG cohort was responsible for the creation of additional 
sales of more than £1,344m, over the three year period, equivalent to £200,000 per 
business. 
Table 27 Sales change 
 2009 2010 2011 
Observations of sales change (A) 205 214 214
Gross sales increase for respective years for sample (B) £11.4m £40.45m £69.53m
Average sales increase i.e. B/A (C) £55,609 £189,019 £324,907
Total EFG population (D) 6,168 6,724 6,724
Surviving businesses (E) 98.9% 87.0% 75.6%
Additional and non-displacing businesses (F) 61.0% 61.0% 61.0%
Attribution to EFG (G) 77.5% 73.1% 70.7%
Deflator (H) 0.9476 0.9738 1.00
Total change for EFG population 2009 (DxExFxGxH)x(C/A) £151.9m £480.0m £712.4m
Average sales change per business £24,630 £71,392 £105,947
The previous SFLG study produced a wide estimate with lower and upper bounds of 
between £74,812,000 and £149,624,800 extra sales, an average of £112,218,400.  With 
3,104 participating businesses in 2006 the scheme was responsible for creating additional 
sales of £36,152.  Counting just the 2011/12 sales a fair comparison from the EFG 
businesses would be an average sales change of £101,729, nearly three times greater.59  
Therefore, both the average sales increase and the smaller scale of the scheme combine 
to produce a much lower overall yield for SFLG than found in the present study. 
                                            
58  Businesses drawing their loan in early 2009 would quote sales for the preceding 12 months, an estimate 
would be made for 2009 sales, 2010 sales, until 2011 sales would be captured in the survey in early 
2012.  In some cases less than two years, because some of the 2009 cohort did not draw on their offer 
until 2010. 
59  This figure may be lower due to the five year rule which targeted SFLG at younger (and smaller) 
businesses. 
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7.3.3 Gross Value Added (GVA) 
From employment change above (Table 25), it is also possible to derive an estimate of 
additional GVA created.60 The table shows additional GVA accruing in each of the three 
years from 2009 to 2011.  This method uses known values of GVA from a secondary 
source (Annual Business Inquiry) then multiplies through the employment change by 
specific SME sector GVA for each individual business.  This resulted in a total GVA 
change of £567m over the three years, or £84,400 per business.  
Table 28 GVA change based on jobs created 
 2009 2010 2011 
Observations of employment change (A) 264 275 275
Jobs created (B) 107 339 572
GVA from jobs created (C) £5.14m £16.03m £26.23m
Average GVA (jobs created) per business i.e. C/A (D) £19,460 £58,310 £95,360
Total EFG population (E) 6,168 6,724 6,724
Surviving businesses (F) 98.9% 87.0% 75.6%
Additional and non-displacing businesses (G) 61.0% 61.0% 61.0%
Deflator (H) 0.9476 0.9738 1.00
Total change for EFG population 2009 (ExFxGxH)x(C/A) £68.6m £202.6m £295.8m
Average GVA per business £11,120 £30,130 £44,000
An employment based GVA calculation is used here to harmonise with other studies to 
provide a better comparison (Table 36).  The SFLG study used an entirely different 
methodology based on sales change.  The overall sales figures were adjusted by applying 
a universal rate of GVA to sales turnover of 0.32961 across all businesses, rather than 
matching SME GVA sector data to individual businesses.  The results for the 2006 cohort 
were £36.9 million for the population, an average of just £11,874 per business.  Using a 
sales based method for EFG the results were still much higher at £39,000 per business.  
Jobs saved 
Table 29 repeats the process above for jobs saved.  It is conservatively assumed that the 
effects of EFG in terms of saving jobs only persists for twelve months after the loan is 
received, rather than for the full three years.  Nevertheless the timing of the loans does 
mean that impacts are evident across 2009-11.  Since the number of jobs saved is so 
much greater than the number of jobs created, the overall GVA saved is much greater, 
                                            
60 GVA represents the incomes generated by economic activity and comprises:  
• compensation of employees (wages and salaries, national insurance contributions, pension 
contributions, redundancy payments etc);  
• gross operating surplus (self-employment income, gross trading profits of partnerships and corporations, 
gross trading surplus of public corporations, rental income etc).  
Although it is possible to estimate GVA directly by asking businesses about wage costs and profits, this 
evaluation used a simpler approach.  GVA is calculated here by multiplying changes in employee 
numbers by sectoral averages of GVA at the economy level. 
61  It is known that employment based estimates of GVA are likely to give higher estimates of GVA than 
estimates based on sales turnover.  Timing will also explain differences in the GVA figures between 
the EFG and SFLG evaluation, as this evaluation is using the latest available data.  
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despite effects persisting for only twelve months.  The total GVA from jobs saved was 
£703.5m or an average of £104,600 per assisted business. 
Table 29 GVA change based on jobs saved (12 months) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Observations of employment change (A) 264 275 17
Jobs saved (B) 521 560 16
GVA from jobs saved (C) £25.79m £27.56m £0.71m
Average GVA (jobs saved) per business i.e. C/A (D) £97,700 £100,200 £41,800
Total EFG population (E) 6,168 6,724 556
Surviving businesses (F) 98.9% 87.0% 75.6%
Additional and non-displacing businesses (G) 61.02% 61.02% 61.02%
Deflator (H) 0.9476 0.9738 1.00
Total change for EFG population 2009 (ExFxGxH)x(C/A) £344.5m £348.3m £10.7m
Average GVA per business £55,848 £51,797 £19,269
7.3.4 Net gains in productivity  
Table 30 shows the changes in sales and employment, as well as the increase in 
productivity over the period 2009-12.  The table shows the sales and employment, from 
which the average productivity is derived.  This average is then multiplied by the number of 
participating EFG businesses, net of survivors and non additional non displacing 
businesses.  Productivity change for the 2009 cohort was an average of £49,400 per 
business.  
Table 30 Productivity change  
Attributable sales increase (A) £684m 
Attributable employment increase (B) 6,453 
Productivity change (Weighted average=A/B) (C) £106,000 
Surviving businesses (D) 76.4% 
Additional and non-displacing businesses (E) 61.0% 
Population size (F) 6,724 
Total change in productivity (CxDxExF) £332.2m 
Average change in productivity £49,400 
The results for the 2006 SFLG cohort were rather more modest, with an average of 
£12,964 per business or £16,437,000 for the whole population. 
7.3.5 Net increase in export earnings 
Exports change over the period 2009-2012 uses a similar method to sales, capturing the 
benefits of exporting change accruing for three years. 
Exports increased between 2009-12 by £37.5m based on 60 observations.  The level of 
attribution to EFG for sales from Table 27 was applied to the 60 exporting businesses and 
this was used as a proxy for attribution of the scheme to overseas sales as well.  Table 31 
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shows additional deductions for failed businesses and non additional businesses.  These 
estimates indicate that the 2009 EFG cohort was responsible for the creation of additional 
exports of more than £460m, over the three year period, equivalent to £290,000 per 
exporting business. 
Table 31 Exports change  
 2009 2010 2011 
Gross exports increase NPV for three years (A) £1.9m £12.5m £23.0m 
Number of exporting businesses (B) 60 60 60 
Average exports (C) B/A £32,418 £208,373 £383,295 
EFG exporting businesses (D) 1,456 1,587 1,587 
Surviving businesses (E) 98.9% 87.0% 75.6% 
Non finance additional (F) 81.6% 81.6% 81.6% 
Attribution to EFG (sales attribution as proxy) (G) 77.5% 73.1% 70.7% 
Deflator (H) 0.9476 0.9738 1.00 
Total change for EFG population 2009 (DxExFxGxH)x (B/A) £27.9m £167.1m £265.3m 
Average exports change per exporting business £19,207 £105,278 £167,194 
The SFLG evaluation found a slightly higher proportion of exporters (27.9 per cent), but 
with a lower proportion of sales represented by exports (7.7 per cent compared with 30.0 
per cent for the EFG 2009 cohort).   
7.4 Economic costs  
While Section 6 focused on the cost to the exchequer of operating the scheme it is also 
possible to quantify the economic cost which includes costs not just to the Exchequer but 
also to the wider economy. 
The 2009 evaluation of SFLG followed the same methodology of the previous 1999 
evaluation by estimating the economic costs as the costs of delivery plus the total 
exchequer costs of default.  Many other evaluations of finance schemes follow this 
approach by using the Exchequer cost as a proxy for the wider economic cost.62  However 
the HMT Green Book is clear that economic “costs should be expressed in terms of 
relevant opportunity costs” which means exchequer cost is not equivalent to economic 
cost.  The approach used for estimating economic cost follows the approach undertaken 
by Ecorys evaluating the DWP growth fund63 which is a loan fund to disadvantaged 
borrowers.  This provides further support and precedence for adopting this approach for 
estimating economic cost rather than using the Exchequer cost. 
The Economic costs of EFG are assumed to include: 
 Opportunity cost of additional funds 
 Cost of additional resources lost (from loan defaults)  
                                            
62  For instance the Evaluation of Community Development Finance Initiatives (CDFIs) 
63  Evaluation Of The DWP Growth Fund Revised Final Report http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/evaluation_growth_fund_report.pdf 
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 Administration costs of operating the scheme 
The first component of economic cost is the opportunity cost of capital, which represents 
the expected rate of return foregone by banks as a result of resources being diverted to 
and tied up in EFG borrowing instead of being used for other uses or lending.  The 
opportunity cost of lending is reduced each year as recipient businesses pay back the 
capital on their loans, so that it can then be relent out by the bank.   
 
Table 32 shows the opportunity cost of capital for the first three years of the scheme.  In 
each year the actual declining balance of the outstanding loan portfolio is shown for 2009-
2011.64  
Since we are only concerned with finance additional businesses65 the outstanding balance 
is only considered for 82.6% of businesses, as indicated by questionnaire findings.  The 
opportunity cost is then calculated by multiplying the finance additional figure by a rate of 
8.5 per cent66, which is an estimated private sector cost of capital.  This is a very 
conservative assumption used to estimate of the cost of capital and assumes EFG is 
displacing other lending in the economy.67  This 8.5 per cent rate is then applied to the 
declining balance of funds accounted for the scheme in every subsequent year to show 
how those funds could alternatively be used. The micro data approach calculates quarterly 
totals, which are then shown as a cumulative annual total in the table.  The total of 
opportunity cost for three years is £86.9m. 
 
 
Table 32 Opportunity cost of capital  
 Year 1 (2009) Year 2 (2010) Year 3 (2011) 
                                            
64   This is based on the size of loan and repayment schedule from the scheme administration microdata.  
The aggregate figures are then adjusted for by accounting for defaults and early repayments. 
65  Non-finance additional businesses would have obtained finance in the absence of the scheme, so there is 
no additional lending occurring. 
66 The Green Book recommends that the Social Discount Rate (SDR), 3.5%- representing the value society 
attaches to present as opposed to future consumption should be used as the standard real discount rate. 
However, complexity arises under EFG as the Government uses private sector resources to deliver the 
scheme which has a risk element. The opportunity cost of using private sector resources may be greater 
than the social discount rate.  Based on UK market evidence using the Capital Asset Pricing model and 
wider international evidence, a Committee on Climate Change paper suggests a real post-tax weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) of around 7-10%.  Taking a mid-point suggests a figure of 8.5% is the 
most appropriate figure to use to estimate the private sector opportunity cost of capital.  See the following 
link for more information:    
http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/Time%20prefernce,%20costs%20of%20capital%20and%20hiddencosts
.pdf 
67  A less conservative assumption would be to estimate a cost of capital of 3.5% to reflect EFG lending 
being 100% additional and not displacing other business lending.  Whilst EFG is facilitating additional 
lending, this evaluation uses the conservative assumption which over estimates the opportunity cost of 
capital tied up in EFG.  
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Outstanding balance68      £575,299,000      £439,546,000      £284,293,000 
Finance additional balance      £475,197,000      £363,065,000      £234,826,000
Opportunity cost (@8.5%)        £24,932,000         £37,492,000         £24,540,000
The second component of economic cost relates to the additional loan defaults that have 
resulted from the operation of EFG.  Default costs reflect resources lost to the economy 
from making banks lend to unviable businesses.  For instance, whilst a factory will have an 
alternative use and can be sold by the bank to cover the debt, other assets (such as 
marketing materials) will have no alternative uses and are lost to the economy in the event 
of a business defaulting.  Based on earlier evidence finance additional loans would not 
otherwise have received any finance and as such any defaults should be considered an 
economic cost.  Table 33 shows the level of defaults in the three years from January 2009 
to December 2011.  Again the business level microdata is used, in combination with 
survey evidence to deduce a finance additional default value for the population.  However, 
not all this money is entirely lost to the economy since there are some recoveries involved 
through reclaiming security.  It is estimated that approximately 7 per cent of the value of 
defaults is recovered.69  The cost of defaults is rather greater than the opportunity cost and 
for three years this equates to £90.5m. 
Table 33 Cost of additional resources lost through defaults by year  
 Year 1 (2009) Year 2 (2010) Year 3 (2011) 
Value of loan defaults70    £28,065,000    £61,758,000    £28,037,000 
Finance additional defaults    £23,182,000    £51,012,000    £23,159,000 
Recoveries (@ 7%)      £1,623,000      £3,571,000      £1,621,000 
Cost of resources lost    £21,559,000    £47,441,000    £21,538,000 
Comparing these two costs, it is possible to see that the effect of defaults and opportunity 
cost is somewhat uneven across the three years.  In the case of opportunity costs this is 
because the size of the loan portfolio is still growing in 2009 as borrowers take up their 
offers throughout the year, while the size of the portfolio peaks in 2010 as all offers have 
been taken up, before it starts to fall in 2011 and subsequent years because of 
repayments.  The cost of defaults in 2010 is more than double than 2009 because of the 
combination of the total size of the portfolio and the effect of higher proportion of default in 
earlier years, which leads to a further fall in 2011. 
Table 34 brings together all the benefits and costs and shows the net benefits when costs 
have been deducted.    The economic costs include the opportunity cost of additional 
finance, as well as the costs of additional defaults and together these amount to £178m.  
The table shows GVA created separately from GVA from jobs saved so that an 
assessment can be made of each, as well as a combined measure.  The gross GVA 
resulting from jobs created is £567m, such that net benefits were £389m.  Adding the jobs 
saved there is a further £703m GVA, producing net benefits of 1,092m. 
                                            
68  Outstanding balance at year end.  Opportunity cost calculated on a quarterly basis. 
69  This is an underestimate of the true level of recoveries as not all recoveries are recorded on the BIS 
administrative data due to banks making recoveries in the first instance. 
70  This is the full loan amount that is defaulted rather than the 75% of the loan the government guarantees 
under EFG. 
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The table also show the discount rate factor and the net present value of the net benefits 
given above.  After applying the standard HMT recommended discount rate of 3.5%, the 
net benefits from jobs created is £368m, while the net benefits for jobs created and saved 
is £1,059m. 
Table 34 Cost Benefit Analysis 
 Year 1 (2009) Year 2 (2010) Year 3 (2011) 3 year total 
GVA created £68,614,000 £202,627,000 £295,843,000 £567,085,000
GVA saved £344,472,000 £348,286,000 £10,714,000 £703,471,000
Opportunity cost (£24,832,000) (£37,492,000)  (£24,540,000)  (£86,864,000)
Cost of resources lost  (£21,559,000) (£47,441,000)  (£21,537,000)  (£90,537,000)
Administration cost (£800,000) - - (£800,000)
Costs total (£47,191,000) (£84,933,000) (£46,077,000) (£178,201,000)
Net Benefits (GVA 
created £21,423,000 £117,694,000 £249,866,000 £388,883,000
Net Benefits (GVA 
created and saved) £365,894,000 £465,980,000 £260,480,000 £1,092,354,000
Discount rate (3.5%) 1.00 0.966 0.934 -
Net Benefits (GVA 
created) NPV £21,423,000 £113,714,000 £233,253,000 £368,390,000
Net Benefits (GVA 
created and saved)  £365,894,000 £450,222,000 £243,161,000 £1,059,277,000
Table 35 presents figures using a number of standardised Benefit Cost Ratios (BCR) 
which allow these results to be compared on a consistent basis to other Cost Benefit 
Analysis.  Three different BCR measures are used. 
The “societal” BCR indicates the social return on investment made by society, including 
costs incurred by both the Government and the private sector.  It is measured as the gross 
economic benefits as a ratio of the total economic cost:  
 
Societal BCR = NPV Gross Economic Benefits / Total Economic Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The “Public Money” BCR indicates the benefit per pound of government spending.   The 
calculation is as follows: 
 
Public money BCR = (NPV Gross Economic Benefits - NPV Private Costs) / NPV Total 
Exchequer Cost 
 73 
The final measure is a Net economic benefit per exchequer pound ratio.  This is a targeted 
measure which shows the level of economic benefits per pound of Government 
Expenditure: 
Net economic benefit per exchequer pound = NPV Net Economic Benefits / NPV Total 
Exchequer Costs 
Table 35 Benefit Cost Ratios  
 3 Year total ratios 
Society BCR (GVA created) 3.1 
Society BCR (GVA created and saved) 7.1 
Public Money BCR (GVA created) 11.7 
Public Money BCR (GVA created and saved) 16.4 
Net Economic Benefit per Exchequer Pound BCR 
(GVA created) 11.7 
Net Economic Benefit per Exchequer Pound BCR 
(GVA created and saved) 33.5 
7.5 Conclusions 
From a cohort of around 6,700 recipients that drew down an EFG loan in 2009, from 2009 
to the start of 2012 EFG has: 
 Created 6,500 additional jobs, equivalent to 0.96 jobs per business 
 Saved 12,400 additional jobs, equivalent to 1.84 jobs per business 
In terms of economic output: 
 An additional £567m of GVA has been created, equivalent to £84,400 per business 
 An additional £703.5m of GVA has been saved , equivalent to £104,600 per 
business 
Under the central scenario which includes the economic benefits from additional 
employment created and saved, the net economic impact of the scheme is found to 
positive with large economic benefits of £1.1bn after taking into account the economic 
costs or operating the scheme.  This results in a societal benefit to cost ratio of 7.1.  For 
every £1 it costs the Government to operate the scheme, there are economic benefits of 
£33.50. 
Sensitivity analysis also confirms positive benefits of £370m if the economic benefits are 
restricted to just additional output created.  This further strengthen the main finding that 
EFG is having a positive benefit to the economy.  In this case, the societal benefit to cost 
ratio is lower at 3.1.  Similarly, for every £1 it costs the Government to operate the 
scheme, there are economic benefits of £11.70. 
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8 Conclusions 
This evaluation has considered a number of different aspects of the EFG scheme and has 
provided an assessment of its effectiveness.  The first consideration is whether the 
rationale for the scheme is valid, namely the demand for finance from potentially viable 
business that are credit-rationed due to a lack of collateral or track record, and whether the 
scheme is accurately targeting this group.  The scheme design and its operation can also 
affect uptake and use of the scheme and remarks concerning these effects are drawn 
together.  The overall effectiveness of EFG on business performance and the wider 
economy is also discussed. 
Rationale for scheme 
 
This evaluation suggests the rational for the scheme is still valid. The results show that 
small businesses lacking security to act as collateral was an issue for many EFG 
businesses.  The survey results confirm the proportion of EFG businesses with collateral 
available to offer was significantly lower than other borrowing businesses, especially the 
availability of business collateral.  Figure 24 showed that few EFG borrowers had smaller 
amounts of collateral available, the median for EFG was between £50,000 - £100,000, 
compared with £250,000 - £500,000 for other borrowers.  EFG borrowers were also more 
constrained in terms of the source of their capital, with only 29 per cent being able to only 
offer business assets as collateral (and therefore use personal assets instead), compared 
with 66 per cent of the more asset-rich other borrowers being able to back their borrowing 
with business assets only.  Only a minority of EFG recipients (around 6%) had access to 
alternative finance sources, but chose to use EFG due to better terms and conditions that 
resulted from lower collateral requirement. 
One possible concern for the scheme might be that lenders are using the government 
guarantee to support businesses they would normally support, creating very substantial 
deadweight.  However, EFG appears to be well targeted on the intended group of 
businesses that would not otherwise have obtained a loan.  The headline figure of 83 per 
cent of EFG borrowers would not have otherwise been able to obtain finance through other 
channels confirms this.  If anything this finding is more remarkable, given the previous 
SFLG evaluation in 2009 suggested a figure of 76 per cent and the 1999 evaluation a 
figure of 70 per cent.  Although these figures are based on the declarations of borrowers, 
rather than lenders, our judgement would be that EFG appears to be appropriately 
targeted, perhaps even more so than SFLG due to the tougher economic conditions and 
tighter supply of finance in 2009.  For the EFG borrowers in 2009, this translates to an 
additional 3,700 businesses being helped compared to the previous SFLG scheme in 
2008. 
The expansion of the SFLG scheme into EFG may also be heralded as a success in terms 
of maintaining the rationale of the scheme but adjusting it to meet the prevailing economic 
conditions.  New provisions in the scheme have enabled larger businesses to take part71, 
as well as larger loan offers.  These new criteria allowed an additional 800 businesses to 
participate in the scheme and survey evidence suggests that the underlying policy 
 
71  Lifting the previous restriction of businesses with less than £5.6m in turnover. 
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rationale was not compromised, since 89 per cent of these larger businesses were finance 
additional. 
The prevailing economic conditions in 2009 provided further justification for the operation 
of the scheme, because survey evidence from respondents suggested a tighter supply of 
finance.  This was represented in higher finance additionality in our survey, as well as EFG 
forming a larger proportion of the total finance package than previously.  For instance, 
EFG represented 91 per cent of the total finance package compared with 48 per cent for 
SFLG.   
At the same time, expansion of the scheme has not been at the expense of a greater 
number of defaults.  Defaults although substantially higher than commercial borrowing 
levels remain lower than the previous scheme despite tougher economic conditions.  This 
may reflect improvements in the design of the scheme over SFLG such as the ability to 
take security and the cap on lender default payments, but more importantly it also confirms 
the scheme is targeted at viable businesses, albeit riskier businesses that lack collateral 
which banks are rightly more cautious about. 
Opinions on scheme design and operation 
While much of this report is given over to a discussion about the benefits of the scheme to 
participating businesses, as well as the wider economy, there are also some 
considerations of how the scheme operates and whether there can be any improvements 
in terms of the service received.  Elements of customer service were not considered, but 
those aspects of the operation of the scheme on business were covered.  Since we 
surveyed EFG users in 2009 then these findings may not be true of subsequent cohorts 
and there may have been some subsequent improvements in service. 
The timeliness of lending was important, with many businesses requiring finance for their 
project within a particular timeframe.  More than half of businesses regarded three months 
as having a notable impact on their business and nearly one quarter would notice some 
business effect for loan decisions taking one month.  However, in 2009 timeliness was one 
area where EFG did not perform well, with 62.6 per cent of EFG borrowers waiting for up 
to one month or more, compared with just 47.6 per cent of other borrowers.  This may not 
be an issue now as a 20-day EFG loan application processing target was introduced in 
August 2010. All the main lenders have signed up to this commitment.  
The survey also asked about the additional 2 per cent BIS premium that EFG businesses 
pay every year in addition to payments to their lenders.  The survey found that 2 per cent 
did appear to be the correct level, since nearly four out of ten businesses report they would 
have been deterred from taking up their loan by a rate of 3 per cent.  It is unclear if this 
would reflect their actual behaviour; given many of the businesses report no other sources 
of finance being available. 
The survey also revealed that prior awareness of EFG may have led to greater number of 
businesses using the scheme, perhaps because the owner/ finance manager could 
mention it to bank staff as part of their normal application for bank finance.  Given the 
recent decline in EFG usage (Figure 34)72, this finding may have implications for greater 
promotion of EFG to the wider business community going forward. 
Figure 34 Value of EFG loans offered and drawn down 
 
72  The quarterly volume of EFG loans was highest shortly after the launch of the scheme, with offers of 
£255m.  This has steadily fallen to offers of £86m between April and June 2012. 
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Business improvements 
Econometric analysis revealed EFG recipient businesses were no different in employment 
or sales growth between 2009 to 2012, compared to other businesses.  The implication of 
these results is that EFG creates a level playing field for the supported businesses to 
realise their growth potential, but that business growth itself is very similar to the peer 
group of other businesses.  The key contribution of EFG is in removing the impediment of 
finance to the growth process. 
One policy-relevant finding was that loans for investment were significantly more likely to 
be associated with employment and sales growth, compared with loans primarily used for 
working capital.  This may have implications for how the scheme is targeted in the future if 
the economy recovers, to ensure maximum impact. 
Economic effectiveness 
The Cost Benefit Analysis used in this evaluation suggests EFG has generated a net 
benefit to the economy overall.   From a cohort of around 6,700 recipients that drew down 
an EFG loan in 2009, EFG has generated £1.1bn of economic benefits after taking into 
account the economic costs of operating the scheme.  EFG has helped sustain economic 
activity during the difficult economic conditions between 2009-2012, as well as helping 
businesses to expand.  From businesses that drew down an EFG loan in 2009, the 
scheme has created and saved 18,800 additional jobs up to the start of 2012.  The results 
also suggest the scheme to be relatively cost effective with a societal benefit to cost ratio 
of 7.1.  For every £1 it costs the Government to operate the scheme, there are economic 
benefits of £33.50. 
It is important to acknowledge that in 2009 EFG had a key role in saving economic activity 
and employment, due to the tough economic conditions at the time.  Around two thirds of 
the credited additional employment is due to jobs saved rather than new additional jobs 
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created.  Although there was a positive impact on new employment creation, it is smaller 
than jobs saved.   
Sensitivity analysis also confirms positive benefits of £370m if the economic benefits are 
restricted to just additional output created, which further strengthen the main finding that 
EFG is having a positive benefit to the economy.  In this case, the societal benefit to cost 
ratio is lower at 3.1, but is still positive.  Under this scenario, for every £1 it costs the 
Government to operate the scheme, there are economic benefits of £11.70. 
To some extent these calculations underestimate the full benefits as taking a longer 5 year 
perspective shows even larger benefits.  This reflects costs being front loaded with 
defaults occurring in the first few years, whilst benefits are likely to continue over many 
years.   
It is important to acknowledge that these positive cost benefit ratios, relate to the scale of 
the programme at the time.  The coverage of EFG on the wider SME lending market is 
very small, as it is targeted at businesses at the margins of the bank lending decision that 
lack collateral or a track record.  In 2009, EFG formed around 3% of the SME term loan 
market, but this has now declined to around 1-2%.  The evaluation results suggest at 
current levels of take-up, the scheme appears to be very cost effective in terms of net 
economic benefits due to low levels of finance deadweight and relatively lower defaults 
than historically.  However, it is important to acknowledge that expanding EFG further 
could lead to more businesses benefiting from the scheme, but this will need to be offset 
against higher finance deadweight or lower quality businesses, which could reduce the 
reported high Benefit Cost Ratios.  
Relative effectiveness 
Table 36 compares EFG with other evaluations of business support schemes for SMEs in 
terms of the cost of jobs created and saved and the societal BCR where available, as well 
as providing further comparison to the previous SFLG scheme.   Care should be taken into 
interpreting these results due to differences in cost benefit methodology and time period 
under consideration. 
Based on these figures EFG appears to be more cost effective than the previous SFLG 
scheme.  This is probably due to a lower default rate and greater need for the scheme in 
the tougher economic environment which lead to lower finance deadweight.73  The results 
also suggest that EFG appears to perform well in terms of cost of job creation for other 
reports considered, as well as surpassing CDFIs in terms of cost per job saved.  EFG also 
appears more successful than other SME schemes in terms of the societal BCR measure 
and is on par with societal BCR for RDA business interventions. 
 
73  The previous SFLG evaluation just focused on additional jobs/ GVA created so is not directly comparable 
to the overall EFG evaluation results.  Comparing just GVA from jobs created is a much fairer 
comparison. 
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Table 36 Comparison with economic effectiveness with other SME schemes 
 
Cost 
per job 
created 
Cost 
per 
job 
saved 
Cost 
per job 
created/ 
saved 
Gross 
benefits 
Economic 
cost 
Societal 
BCR 
(Gross 
Benefits/ 
economic 
cost 
Time 
period 
EFG £5,200 £2,700 £1,800 £1,231m £172m 7.1 3 years 
SFLG74 £7,750 - 
£24.6m- 
£49.1m 
GVA 
created 
£35m 
(represented 
by exchequer 
cost) 
0.7-1.4 2 years 
CDFIs75 £8,820 £8,863 
£174m 
GVA 
created 
£254m 
saved = 
£428m 
No 
information 
given 
 
Business Link 
local service76 
£11,578  
over a six-
month 
period 
additional 
value-
added is 
£362.5m 
overall cost of 
operating the 
network for 
six months at 
around 
£150m 
2.26 12-18 
months. 
RDA (business 
interventions)77 
  £14,221
£7,690.4 
from jobs 
created and 
saved 
£1,053.0m 7.3  
Summary 
This evaluation provides evidence to support the rationale for the EFG scheme, namely 
that it is being targeted at small businesses who lack collateral and would otherwise not be 
able to access conventional bank loans without being backed by the government 
guarantee.  Having enabling businesses to access a loan the subsequent performance of 
these businesses is at least equal to other borrowers, indicating that EFG has helped 
created a level playing field for them to fulfil their potential.  At existing levels of utilisation, 
this evaluation finds EFG to be cost effective with a societal Benefit Cost ratio of 7.1.  For 
every £1 it costs the Government to operate the scheme, there are estimated economic 
benefits of £33.50.  Based on our cost benefit analysis calculations, we can report that the 
EFG was a viable and cost effective policy for helping finance constrained smaller 
businesses in 2009 to access debt finance to support growth and cashflow. 
                                            
74 http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file54112.doc 
75 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/enterprise/docs/10-814-evaluation-community-development-finance-
institutions 
76 http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file40289.doc 
77 http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file50735.pdf 
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Whilst EFG lending only covers a small proportion of the total SME term lending market, 
expanding EFG further by relaxing the entry requirements could lead to more businesses 
benefiting from the scheme.  This may need to be offset against higher finance deadweight 
and possibly lower quality businesses using the scheme, which could reduce the high 
reported Benefit Cost Ratios.  
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Appendix 1 Survey methodology 
Fieldwork 
The research was conducted by IFF Research via telephone interviews with businesses 
who had received an EFG backed loan in 2009 and also with a matched sample of non-
EFG users from the general business population. The non-user sample was matched in 
terms of business age, legal status of business i.e. whether limited or unlimited and by 
broad business sector. The ‘non-user’ businesses were sourced from Dun & Bradstreet's 
business database.   
The main fieldwork was conducted during February and March 2012 and the average 
interview duration during fieldwork was around 25 minutes for users and 16 minutes for 
non-users.   The questionnaire was fully piloted prior to the start of the main fieldwork.   
Table 37 below shows the number of sample records available, the number of EFG 
businesses for whom we were able to source a telephone number for (using both 
automated and manual telephone look-up approaches), the approximate number of 
records lost due to unusable sample (unobtainable telephone number, duplicate records 
etc.) and the number of interviews completed within each of the sample groups along with 
the associated response rates.  Response rates have been calculated by dividing the 
number of completed interviews by the total number of contacts for which a definite 
outcome was achieved during the fieldwork period. 
Table 37 Survey Coverage 
 EFG Users Non-Users 
   
SAMPLE CLEANING 
Total in-scope records provided 
(guaranteed/repaid) 6,504 11,306 
Telephone number found 3,398 n/a 
CATI SCREENING 
Selection for CATI 3,398 11,306 
Unusable – ineligible for interview, 
business contact details incorrect, number 
unobtainable, etc. 
855 1,495 
ACHIEVED INTERVIEWS/RESPONSE RATE 
Total useable sample 2,543 9,811 
Sample with a definite outcome 
(completed interview, refusal, terminated 
interview) 
709 2,254 
Interviews achieved 500 899 
Response rate (%) 71% 41% 
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The achieved sample of users (Table 38) and non-users (Table 39) were weighted by age 
of business, turnover and broad sector (production / service / other) to reflect the 
population of EFG users overall, based on the database of recipients. 
Table 38 EFG users 
  Up to £1m £1,000,001 to £5m Over £5m 
  Unweighted number 
Weighted 
number 
Unweighted 
number 
Weighted 
number 
Unweighted 
number 
Weighted 
number 
Production 25 26 4 6 0 0 
Service 
132 173 14 19 3 2 
U
p 
to
 4
 y
ea
rs
 
Other sectors 
9 17 3 4 0 0 
Production 
56 22 30 23 2 6 
Service 
121 106 55 50 16 13 
O
ve
r 4
 y
ea
rs
 
Other sectors 
15 16 14 14 1 3 
 
Table 39 Non users 
  Up to £1m £1,000,001 to £5m Over £5m 
  Unweighted number 
Weighted 
number 
Unweighted 
number 
Weighted 
number 
Unweighted 
number 
Weighted 
number 
Production 40 46 8 9 4 1 
Service 135 314 12 32 5 3 
U
p 
to
 4
 y
ea
rs
 
Other sectors 15 33 3 6 0 0 
Production 91 40 34 41 21 11 
Service 281 190 107 91 71 24 
O
ve
r 4
 y
ea
rs
 
Other sectors 47 29 16 28 9 1 
 
Econometric analysis 
Regression analysis was performed on the percentage employment growth (2009-2012), 
and then sales turnover growth (2009-2012) against business experience of the owner 
managers, the age of the owner managers, and whether or not the owner managers 
possessed a degree.  Additionally, the reason for seeking finance – investment reasons 
versus cash flow was included.  A dummy variable was included of whether the business 
was older than four years old; the size of the business as measured by the number of 
employees, and whether the business was a social enterprise were also incorporated into 
the models.  As with standard practice the sectoral dummy variables of the main business 
activities were included.   
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Table 40 OLS Regression Models Relating to percentage employment growth 
and percentage sales turnover growth 78 
 Employment 
Growth (%) 
Sales Turnover 
Growth (%) 
Constant 2.151 (0.122) 18.807 (1.012) 
10 to 15 years of experience -15.971 (-1.512) -4.303 (-0.416) 
More than 15 years of 
experience 
0.320 (0.029) 6.330 (0.573) 
Age OM 45 to 54 years old -21.240 (-2.269)b -22.042 (-2.353)b 
Age OM 55 to 64 years old -11.152 (-0.915) -1.570 (-0.135) 
Age OM 65 years, or older -34.528 (-1.494) -9.547 (-0.414) 
Degree 27.696 (3.520)a 16.213 (2.074)b 
Investment reason 19.527 (2.384)b 21.698 (2.696)a 
Business Older than 4 years -23.679 (-2.833)a -40.590 (-4.936)a 
Size -0.262 (-1.794)c -0.154 (-1.060) 
Social Enterprise 3.042 (0.352) -5.795 (-0.632) 
EFG User 16.944 (1.387) 1.045 (0.090) 
Other loan user 32.383 (2.774)a 16.281 (1.401) 
Amount of EFG Loan -3.191E10 (-0.025) 0.000 (1.242) 
Amount of EFG loan 2 5.892E6 (0.069 -1.082E-10 (-0.900) 
SIC A and E (Agriculture etc) 7.223 (0.216) 79.889 (2.301)b 
SIC C (Manufacturing) 29.087 (1.821)c 32.678 (1.951)c 
SIC G (Retail & wholesale) 10.465 (0.681) 28.709 (1.770)c 
SIC H (Hotels etc) 5.545 (0.291) 2.130 (0.100) 
SIC I (Transport etc) 28.242 (1.256) 25.368 (1.093) 
SIC K (Real Estate etc) 12.652 (0.830) 30.397 (1.883)c 
SIC MNO 20.374 (1.209) 24.121 (1.344) 
R2 0.152 0.186 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.134 
F Test 3.345a 3.550a 
N 411 347 
Excluded comparisons: Businesses who have not used EFG or other loans; Up to 9 years 
of experience; Age OM up to 44 years old; and, SIC F Construction. 
Overall, the model is statistically significant (F Test), offering some predictive power in 
explaining changes in employment growth and sales growth.  However, these 
specifications only explain a small proportion of changes (R2=15% for employment and 
R2=19 per cent for sales), leaving most change unexplained. 
In terms of our results, attention focuses upon variables which are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level, or better, and we look at both sets of results together.  Businesses which 
were more than four years old in 2009 grew by 24 per cent and 41 per cent less than 
younger businesses with regard to employment and sales turnover, respectively.  
Businesses which had used other loans grew by 32 per cent more than those businesses 
                                            
78  a significance <0.01, b significance <0.05, c significance <0.10 
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which had not used other loans or EFG.  However, there was no statistically significant 
relationship in the model of sales turnover growth.  Owner managers aged 45 to 54 years 
old saw their businesses grow by 21 per cent, and 22 per cent less than the businesses of 
younger owner managers for employment and sales turnover, respectively.  Owner 
managers with degrees saw their businesses grow by 28 per cent and 16 per cent more 
than the corresponding businesses of those without degree-educated owners for 
employment and sales turnover, respectively.  Businesses where they were seeking 
finance for investment reasons grew by 20 per cent and 22 per cent more than businesses 
which sought finance for cash flow reasons for employment and sales turnover, 
respectively. 
Perhaps most importantly an EFG loan was found not to be significant in explaining either 
employment growth or sales growth.  The size of the loan and also the squared term which 
was included to capture possible non-linear relationships but neither were statistically 
significant in both of the sets of results.  Thus, the magnitude of the EFG finance received 
by businesses does not have any bearing upon the two business performance measures. 
 
 
Appendix 2 Application process 
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Appendix 3 Exchequer costs with 
flowbacks 
EFG also leads to revenue flow backs to the Exchequer through tax receipts associated 
with higher employment and sales and also through welfare savings.  These figures are 
not used in the economic cost benefit analysis but are useful to consider the net cost to the 
Government of operating EFG.  
Table 41 estimates the revenue flow backs to the Exchequer associated with additional 
employment in supported EFG businesses. The three components are income tax 
associated with new employment, national insurance contributions by the employee and 
employers National Insurance.  The data covers revenue flow backs over a three year 
period (2009-2012) in line with the earlier analysis, which assumes persistence of the 
attributed jobs created. The implied net additional income tax is £42.1m, the implied net 
additional Employee NI contribution is £23.5m, while employers NI is £27.7m. 
Table 41 Tax and National Insurance Receipts79 
Variable Estimated unit Estimated Revenue 
Flow backs 
per net £ incurred 
Net additional income tax (based on net 
jobs created*tax rates for deciles of income) 
42,074,000 £1.25 
Net additional Employee NI (based on net 
jobs created* NI rates for deciles of income) 
23,472,000 £0.70 
Net additional Employers NI (based on net 
jobs created* NI rates for deciles of income) 
27,697,000 £0.82 
From Table 42, it is noted that if revenue flowbacks to the Exchequer are taken into 
consideration then the net costs of EFG change substantially.  Because of the scale of 
estimated employment gains there is a net benefit to the exchequer of £59.5m.  It is also 
important to note that this revenue flow back estimate does not allow for any additional 
VAT contribution associated with net additional sales, or any contribution arising from 
exports. This is avoided as it would require additional estimates of whether consumers are 
making additional purchases or simply shifting expenditure from one basket of goods and 
services to other containing products and services from EFG supported businesses.  
                                            
 Benefit expenditure savings are ignored from the calculations. 
79  The SFLG study also included a small amount of benefits savings from some entrepreneurs moving 
from benefits to start their business.  This question was not asked in the 2012 survey and so this 
amount is omitted. 
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Table 42 Estimated Exchequer revenue flow backs  
 Estimated Revenue Flow backs 
per net £ incurred 
Net EFG Cost Incurred (33,669,000) 
Net Additional Income Tax associated with 
employment additionality  
42,074,000 
Net Additional Employee National Insurance 
associated with employment additionality 
23,472,000 
Net Additional Employers National Insurance 
associated with employment additionality 
27,697,000 
Net EFG Cost taking into account revenue 
flowbacks to the exchequer 
59,574,000 
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Appendix 4 Five year scenario 
The main CBA presented in this report is for three full years of operation (January 2009 to 
January 2012), because this was based on actual survey evidence conducted at this time.  
However, it is possible to extrapolate for a further two years to present an alternative case 
of five full years of operation, running from January 2009 to December 2013.  Table 43 
and Table 44 shows the costs of the scheme, with the first three years (2009-2011) 
repeated from early tables, adding in 2012 and 2013.  Opportunity costs in 2012 and 2013 
fall substantially in Table 43 because of the falling number of active loans and the reduced 
repayments outstanding.  Table 44 shows the cost of finance additional defaults and this 
also continues to fall, as the default rate decelerates further, combined with a smaller 
balance outstanding.  Although the scenario only extends five years, these trends will 
continue, with falling costs for every successive year for the 2009 EFG cohort. 
Table 43 Opportunity cost of capital (2009-13) 
 Year 1 
(2009) 
Year 2 
(2010) 
Year 3 
(2011) 
Year 4 
(2012) 
Year 5 
(2013) 
Outstanding balance £575,299,000 £439,546,000 £284,293,000  £177,434,000     £91,226,000 
Finance additional balance £475,197,000 £363,065,000 £234,826,000 £146,561,000     £75,353,000 
Opportunity cost (@8.5%)   £24,932,000   £37,492,000  £24,540,000    £14,874,000       £8,109,000 
Table 44 Cost of additional resources lost through defaults by year (2009-13)  
 Year 1 
(2009) 
Year 2 
(2010) 
Year 3 
(2011) 
Year 4 
(2012) 
Year 5 
(2013) 
Value of loan defaults    £28,065,000    £61,758,000    £28,037,000    £12,754,000    £6,431,000 
Finance additional defaults    £23,182,000    £51,012,000    £23,159,000    £10,535,000     £5,312,000 
Recoveries (@ 7%)      £1,623,000      £3,571,000      £1,621,000         £737,000        £372,000 
Cost of resources lost    £21,559,000    £47,441,000    £21,537,000      £9,798,000     £4,940,000 
The only additional benefits associated with the 2009 cohort operating until 2013 are those 
associated with the jobs created.  Since the effects of the jobs saved was conservatively 
assumed to only persist for twelve months then they remain at the levels indicated in the 
body of the report (Table 29).  In the fourth year of the scheme (2012) there would be 
expected to be a cumulative total of 8,420 jobs, equivalent to a GVA of £397m and in the 
fifth year (2013) these figures would be 10,319 jobs and a GVA of £498m. 
Table 45 brings together the economic costs and benefits for five years, showing the totals 
for the first three years from Table 34 and adding columns for 2012 and 2013.  Costs are 
declining, while benefits are increasing and the overall result is a societal BCR of 9.82. 
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Table 45 Net EFG Benefits (NPV) 
 Years 1-3  
(2009-11) 
Year 4  
(2012) 
Year 5  
(2013) 
5 year total 
GVA Created £567,085,000 £396,656,000 £498,494,000 1,462,235,000
GVA saved £703,471,000 - - £703,471,000
Opportunity cost (£86,864,000) (14,874,000) (8,109,000) (109,848,000)
Cost of resources lost (£90,537,000) (9,798,000) (4,940,000) (105,275,000)
Administration cost (£800,000)  (£800,000)
Costs total (£178,201,000) (24,672,000) (13,049,000) (215,923,000)
Net Benefits (GVA 
created £388,883,000 371,984,000 485,445,000 1,246,312,000
Net Benefits (GVA 
created and saved) £1,092,354,000 371,984,000 485,445,000 1,949,783,000
Discount rate (3.5%) varies 0.9019 0.8714 
Net Benefits (GVA 
created) NPV £368,390,000 334,593,000 423,017,000 1,126,899,000
Net Benefits (GVA 
created and saved) 
NPV 
£1,059,277,000 335,493,000 423,017,000 1,817,787,000
The exchequer costs discussed in Section 6 also change across a further two years, with 
additional failures drawing on the government guarantee, while being offset by more 
premium income from businesses that continue to operate (Table 46).  The cap for 
government guarantees was set at 9.75% of the portfolio, equivalent to just over £65 
million and by December 2013 total guarantees of £64 million should have been paid80.  
The cost of additional guarantees continued to be greater than the premium income and 
therefore the direct exchequer cost increased to a level of £35 million. 
Table 46 Summary of net EFG costs to Exchequer (to December 2013) 
 £ 
Cost of called in guarantees (64,261,000) 
Administration costs  (800,000) 
Premium income 29,644,000 
Net EFG Costs (35,417,000) 
Net costs per business (5,300) 
                                            
80  The scenario set out in the main body of the report involves actual default rates, whilst these figures 
involve projections of loan defaults and premium income receipts.  
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